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ABSTRACT
Projecting Regional Financial Stress in Agriculture under Various Policy
Conditions. (May 1995)
Kenneth Ray Adix, B.S., Texas A&M University;
M B.A., The University of Texas at Austin
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. John B. Penson, Jr.
The objective of this study was to measure the relative financial stress on
U.S. farmers resulting from various government policies. U.S. fanners
experienced extreme levels of financial Stress during the 1980s due to several
factors. In the early 1970s, U.S. real net cash farm income reached historic levels
and provided the impetus for the record levels 6f debt acquired by fanners in the
latter stages of the 1970s. This debt was used to expand their operation in the
hope of meeting expected future growth in demand. In the 1980s, however, the
combination of low earnings, record debt, and high interest rates resulted in severe
financial stress for many farmers, high loan losses for agricultural lenders, and
huge government payments to fanners.
A model was developed to explain regional trends in the percent of farm
loan volume delinquent 30 days sp^ore and percent of fanners filing for
bankruptcy. Other indicators of regional financial stress analyzed in this study
were: the times*interest-eamed'ratip, the debt burden.ratio, the financial leverage
IV
index and the debt-to-asset ratio. An existing econometric simulation model of
the U.S. economy was used to project aggregate financial statements under four
different policy scenarios.
The six measures of financial stress used in this study were projected from
1994 to 2000 irnder three policy scenarios and compared to a baseline scenario.
The baseline assumes that the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is eliminated.
The other three scenarios being compared to the baseline are: (1) a continuation
of CRP, (2) a ten percent reduction in target prices from baseline levels, and (3)
a two percent decrease in the growth rate of the money , supply from baseline
levels.
Overall, the reduction in the money supply was the most financially
stressful of all the policy alternatives considered in this study. The Com Belt and
Plains regions suffered the highest levels of financial stress in the U.S., especially
when growth in money supply was decreased or'when target prices were reduced
ten percent. In general, the South region experienced the least financial stress of
any region under all policy scenarios. An interesting finding was that farmers
actually experienced more financial stress if CRP is continued than if it is
eliminated. This mainly occurs because of the increase in deficiency payments
*
occurring when CRP was eliminated.
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In the front seat of agriculture's roller-coaster ride over the last 25 years were
U S. farmers, agricultural lending institutions and the U S. government Beginning
in the early 1970'$, farmers saw a rapid increase in net income and expanded their
use of debt in the hope of maximizing future profits. Lenders were eager to lend
to farmers in order to increase their own market share of agricultural loans
Financial institutions usual concern over loans defaulting was minimized by the
rising values in the assets they hetd as collateral. In the 1980s, however, the
combination of low earnings, record debt and high interest rates led to falling net
farm incomes and land values. When farmers and lenders experienced rising
levels of stress in the mid-1980s, government programs pumped Millions of dollars
into agriculture.
In retrospect, it is not hard to comprehend the euphoria that existed in the
early 1970s. United States real net cash farm income increased over 80 percent
in two years (1971-1973). In addition, U S. agricultural exports increased 174
percent (SI3.5 billion) from 1971 to 1974 (USDA-ERS I994d) Many believed
this was just the beginning, that past chronic food surpluses would give way to
(
The style and format of this dissertation follow that of the A mcrican Journal of
Agricultural Fxonomics.
chronic shortages. Thus, farmers desire to maximize their growth in net worth
(profits and unrealized capital gains) required further borrowing to expand their
operations.
The increasing value of the land further fueled investment outlays and helped
to secure many new loans. The value of real farm assets grew over 73 percent in
the 1970s. Thus, despite debt levels increasing $?5 billion (in real terms) in the
1970s, the debt-to-asset ratio actually fell from 18 to 17 percent from 1970 to
1980. .This flowed fanners unprecedented borrowing capacity in their pursuit of
higher net income, because lenders tended to base lending decisions primarily on
collateral value.
Unfortunately, net cash farm income peaked in 1973 in real terms and fell
in every subsequent year (except 1978) during the 1970s (Figure 1.1). Despite the
fall in earnings, farmers continued to expand their operations, increasing their level
of debt every year during the 1970s (Figure 1.2). Farmers nominal aggregate debt
reached $167 billion in 1980, an increase of over 240 percent from 1970.
When farmers' debt (in real terms) peaked in 1981, their ability to service
this debt Was at its lowest point since 1970. Consider two key measures t>f debt
servicing ability: (1) the times-interest-eamed ratio and (2) the debt burden^ratio.
In 1981, the times-interest-eamed ratio [TIE * (Net Cash Farm Income + Farm
Interest Expense) / Farm Interest Expense] of 2.7 was over 300 percent less than
the level of 8.7 in 1973 (Figure 1.3). Also, the debt burden ratio (Farm Debt
Outstanding / Net Cash Farm Income) was 300 percent higher in 1981 (5.7) than
 
Figure 1.3 U S. Farmers* Times-Interest-Earned Ratio, 1970-93 (USDA-ERS I994d)
Figure 1.4 U S. Fanners' Debt Burden Ratio, 1970-93 (USDA-ERS 1994d)
in 1973 (1.9) (Figure 1.4). The prime interest rate was also at a record level of
18.87 percent in 1981. Thus, fanners and lenders sat precariously at the top of the
roller-coaster, awaiting the inevitable plummet.
Agriculture's financial deterioration in the early-1980s was reflected in thg
high loan losses of the largest holder of U.S. real estate farm debt: the Farm
Credit System (FCS). FCS loan losses rose from less than $S0 million in 1982
to $1.32 billion in 1986. FCS losses over the 1982-1988 period were about $3.8
billion, of which nearly two-thirds were at Federal Land Banks (Sullivan).
Commercial banks serving agriculture also experienced severe stress in the 1980s.
Agricultural commercial banks' (defined as those banks whose ratio of farm*
loans to total loans is greater than 13 percent) nonperforming farm loans rose from
$.9 billion in 1982 to $2.6 biltlon in 1983, when they accounted for 7.3 percent
of total farm production loans outstanding at these banks. Net charge-offs (loans
that banks write-off as a loss because repayment is unlikely) of non-real estate
farm loans at commercial banks peaked at $1.3 billion in 1983. Agricultural bank
failures soared in the mid-1980s as loan losses mounted. Whereas only one bank
failed in 1981, 66 went broke in 1983, 63 failed in 1986 and 69 failed in 1987
(Sullivan).
One can only imagine how high lender losses would have been if the
government farm program safety net had not been there to support farm incomes.
At the start of the 1980s, farmers received about $1.8 billion annually from the
government in the form of direct government payments. However, by 1985,
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payments to fanners were over four times that amount ($7.7 billion). From 198S
to 1989, government payments to agriculture totalled over $61 billion. In 1987,
government payment* of $16.7 billion accounted for 30 percent of real net cash
farm income.
Given the high cost of unforeseen financial stress, it appears that a system
that could serve as an early-warning device for.financial strewn agriculture
would be beneficial. First, such a system could provide policymakers with
projections of the relative financial stress associated with various policy
alternatives. Agricultural lenders also could use these projections as a basis for
(1) adjusting the growth and composition of their portfolios and (2) setting their
allowance for loan losses. Finally, farmers, farm input manufacturers and others
associated with agriculture would also gain an insight to the potential effects of
different government programs on farm financial stress and what this means for
input and output sales activity.
Objectives
The main objective of this study is the application of estimated equations and
other indicators of financial stress to policy analysis. Indicators of financial stress
can be defined in a variety of ways The percent of farm loan volume delinquent
30 days or more at a financial institution and percent of farmers in tht institution's
lending area who have filed for bankruptcy are two such indicators.
Others include the times-interest-eamed ratio, the debt burden ratio, the
7
financial leverage index (ROE AROA), and the debt-to-asset ratio. All of these
measures of financial stress will be projected at the regional level for each policy
scenario examined in this study. Thus, when evaluating the impact of various
government policies, one will be able to examine the trend in a broad set of short-
run and long-run measures of financial stress.
Econometric relationships will be estimated using historical information on
financial stress and performance for five regions of the country. These
relationships will be used as a basis for projecting delinquencies and bankruptcies.
Other definitional relationships will be developed to assess the degree of coverage
for principal and interest payments in agriculture. Once developed, these
equations will be utilized in conjunction with the macroeconomic simulation
model named AG-GEM. AG-GEM places specific emphasis on U. S. agriculture
i
and the interface between the macroeconomy and the domestic agricultural sector
(Penson and Taylor).
AG-GEM will be used to project the impact various government policies
have on agriculture's financial statements as well as the above measures of
financial stress. These impacts will then be regionalized using available secondary
data. 'Currently, there is considerable debate over the various government farm
programs that will comprise the 1995 Farm Bill. Government is under intense
pressure to cut the budget. One of the areas it is looking at is farm programs.
One program receiving considerable attention is the Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP) £rP was part of the 198$ Farm Bill legislation that paid farmers to idle
highly erodible land for ten years. There are approximately 36 million acres
currently in CRP. These acres were originally eligible to come back into
production in 1996, ten years after they entered. Due to a roll-back, CRP acres
will start coming back into production in 1997.
The ultimate outcome of CRP*s future is unknown. Therefore, two separate
scenarios concerning CRP will be examined:
• Elimination of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). This will be
captured in the baseline scenario.
• A 100 percent continuation of the CRP.
A third scenario will examine the affects of reducing target prices by 10 percent
from baseline levels. In addition, a fourth (and final) scenario assumes the Federal
Reserve slows the growth rate of the monetary base by two percent from baseline
levels over the next five years.
It is important to recall that the objective of this study is to project future
financial stress under alternative policies. The goal is not to determine the
ultimate outcome of a given loan or class of loans. Nor is the objective to
forecast that ”X petcent" of farm loans will be delinquent in a given year.
Instead, the goal is to measure the relative impact that various government
policies are likely to have on a broad set of financial stress indicators including
the potential change in delinquencies at agricultural banks. For instance, what is
the relative impact on financial stress in each region if the Federal Reserve slows
the growth rate of the money supply by two percent in each of the next five
years? Thus, the addition of a regional financial stress component to AG-GEM
will enhance the capability ofACj-GEM to analyze alternative policy scenarios and
their affects. This should provide valuable information to farmers, agricultural
lenders, farm input manufacturers and policymakers.
Procedures
Data on regional financial stress will be obtained from annual surveys of
agricultural banks done by the American Bankers Association (ABA). Sam and
Wallace aggregated these ABA survey results into five regions: West, Plains,
Northeast, Com Belt and South (See Figure I.S). To qualify as an agricultural
bank, the institution must have either S2.5 million or more in farm production or
real estate loans or have greater than SO percent of its loan portfolio in farm loans.
/
, Annual farm balance sheet and income statement data will be obtained at the
r
Figure 1.5 Regions of the United States
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state level from the Economic Research Service-United States Department of
Agriculture (ERS-USDA). These numbers will be aggregated into the
aforementioned five regions. Regional financial performance measures that
theoretically hold a causal relationship with loan delinquency and bankruptcy will
be employed as independent variables in econometrically-estimated equations. For
example, the times-interest-eamed ratio, which measures the ability to cover
interest expense from the farm's net cash flow, and debt burden ratio, which
reflects the long-run coverage for outstanding debt, will be investigated.
The statistical package used will be Shazam. Seemingly Unrelated
Regression (SUR) will be used to estimate a system of ten equations. The first
five equations each represent the "percent of farm loan volume delinquenrtO'tiays'
or more” dependent variable in each of the five regions. The last five equations
represent the same five regions, but use the percent of farmers in the farm bank
lending area who filed for bankruptcy as the dependent variable.
SUR will be used rather than Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression due
to an a priori belief that the error terms between the regions are correlated. It
seems logical that a random shock not accounted for in the model that affected
one region will affect other regions as well. SUR will be used over pooling data
because SUR allows the coefficients to differ across regions. However, the SUR
model’s coefficients will be tested to see if they are statistically different across
regions. If no significant differences exist, the data will be pooled as this allows
for the usage of more data points in the estimation of each coefficient.
Since only twelve years of data exist for the dependent variables, the model
will be estimated using all twelve years. Therefore, model validation will consist
of checking for proper signs and statistical significance of coefficients. All
variables will be transformed into logs so that differences in coefficient values
caused by scaling will be eliminated and coefficients can be interpreted as
elasticities. Given the time series nature of the data, tests for autocorrelation will
be performed.
Regional and national data on past dues is limited to the period, 1982-93.
Thus, a test will be developed to determine if the model would differ had 1970s
data on past dues been available. First, this study will find which independent
variables create the best model for projecting regional financial stress using
regional data (1982-93) on past dues as the dependent variable. Next, these same
independent variables will be used in a national model that predicts past dues at
the national level. The next step will be to find a proxy for past dues during the
1970s.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System publish data on the
provision for loan and lease tosses as a percentage of total loans at agricultural
banks from 1970-93. Banks are legally required to set aside funds (i.e. make
provisions for loan losses) for loans that are experiencing repayment problems.
Thus, one should expect a hig)i degree of correlation between the percent of loans
that are 30 days or more past due and the allowance for loan losses as a
percentage of total loans. To test this expectation, percent of loans past due will
12
>e regressed on the allowance for loan losses as a percentage of total loans. If the
It is high (greater than 90 percent), allowance for loan loss will be used as a
jroxy for past dues in the national model.
Since data on allowances, for loan loss are available at the national level
<
from 1970*93, a national model will be estimated for this time period. Next, the
null hypothesis that coefficients are not different between the two time periods
(1970*81 and 1982*93) will be tested using the Chow test If the coefficients for
the two time periods are not statistically different at the national level, it should
alleviate some concern, over the lack of 1970s data at the regional level.
Finally, the four policy conditions will be simulated using the regional
model. Given any of these four scenarios, the model will project a broad set of
indicators of financial stress at the regional level including the potential change
in delinquencies and bankruptcies at agricultural banks. Thus, policymakers,
agricultural lenders, farmers and others will be able to analyze the projected trends
in financial stress resulting from these policy changes.
Summary
In the 1980s, unforeseen financial stress resulted in the loss of billions of
dollars to U.S. farmers, agricultural lending institutions and U.S. taxpayers. These
losses legitimize this study's objective of applying estimated equations and other
ecohomic and financial indicators useful in predicting aggregate financial stress
in agriculture. This study will analyze the regional financial stress results from
13
four government policy scenarios (two dealing with CRP, one focusing on target
price cuts and one regarding slower growth in the money supply).
CHAPTER n
REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Introduction
The purpose of this.chapter is to discuss previous studies and theories
regarding a set of aggregate economic and financial indicators used in measuring
aggregate financial stress in agriculture. Many of the measures discussed were
previously developed and tested at the firm level. However, it seems logical to
assume that these measures remain valid in assessing financial stress, even when
firms are aggregated to the regional level.
Previous studies relevant to this research are summarized in the following
three categories: (1) analyzing aggregate financial stress and risk, (2) the
relationship between macroeconomy and financial sector and (3) financial ratios
as predictors of financial stress.
Anidyzlng Aggregate Financial Stress and Risk
Despite considerable literature dealing with predicting the ultimate success
or failure of an individual loan (i.e. credit scoring), little is written on assessing
financial stress and its impacts at the aggregate level. One of the few aggregate
studies was done by Hogan et al. in 1987. At the time, the authors found no
precedent for their work, stating, "Somewhat surprisingly, no previous attempts to
15
build aggregate loan losses models .poufd be found in the banking literature".
Their study used stepwise regression to develop aggregate models that predicted
loan losses for the entire loan portfolio of a bank in Idaho. The following four
loan groups were modeled: consumer loans, agriculture Idkns, commercial loans
and real estate loans. Although the consumer loan loss model had some success,
the other three produced unsatisfactory results.
Shepard and Collins used aggregate U S. data from 1910-78 to identify the
determinants of failure in the agricultural sector. They identified aggregate real
net farm income, average farm size (measured in acres), farm debt-to-asset ratio,
and rate of non-farm failures as being significant explanatory variables. The
importance of these variables varied when the analysis was divided into pre-WWII
and post-WWII periods.
Oltmans developed aggregate models ofProduction Credit Association (PCA)
and Federal Land Bank (FLB) loan quality using Ordinary Least Squares in a
pooled cross section time series framework. The author analyzed loan quality and
farm sector financial information for the St. Louis Farm Credit District. The
estimated models explained much of the variation in quality of PCA loans from
1969-88 and in FLB loans from 1974-88 in the former St. Louis Farm Credit
District. However, these models were unable to predict loan quality changes in
advance The author suggests future research in developing aggregate models
adapted to different geographic regions as well as to assessing the loan quality of
agricultuftthbanks
16
Conrad and DeBoer studied the determinants of rural property tax
delinquency using pooled cross-section time series data for thirteen, agriculturally
dependent Indiana counties over the 1970-84 period. These authors found that
. agricultural recession causes the property tax delinquency rate to increase. The
explanatory variables used were: the farm debt-to-asset ratio, farm and non-farm
income, and the ratio of the interest rate to the delinquency penalty rate.
Goodman examined the results from a survey of 37 U S. commercial banks
who lend to developing countries. Goodman reported three analytical approaches
these banlts used in evaluating countries with whom they do business. The vast
majority of banks (32 of the 37 surveyed) used a qualitative system structured
around discussion of a country's economic, political and social conditions and
prospects. The most quantitative evaluation method was a checklist system. The
checklist rating is derived by scoring the subject country with respect to indicators
or variables that can be either quantitative or qualitative. Only onq bank
statistically tested the correlation between its checklist results and the actual
repayment experience.
Group of Thirty published a report by a study group on international
banking. ‘The group found several problems with both the political and economic
sides of country risk assessment systems Serious problems existed in the quality
and availability of data In addition, lags in data reporting can be quite serious,
sometimes rendering the available statistics virtually useless. Competitive
pressures may lead banks to override country risk assessments and lend funds.
17
even though signs of economic difficulty may already be present.
Relationship between Macroeconohiy and Financial Sector
Many articles have examined the causal relationship between the
macroeconomy and the financial sector during the Great Depression. The guise
of many arguments was the 1929-30 recession resulted in bank failures that, in
turn, resulted in a further downturn in the economy, ultimately leading to the
Great Depression. Friedman and Schwartz believed that the difficulty of banks
worsened the general economy by reducing the wealth of bank shareholders and,
more importantly, by leading to a rapid fall in the supply,of money.
Bemanke, extending Friedman and Schwartz's work, argued for a third way
in which the financial crisis may have affected the economy. He believed the
disruptions of 1930-33 reduced the effectiveness of the financial sector as a whole
in performing its role as an intermediator between borrowers and lenders. This
increased both the cost and difficulty of obtaining credit (especially for farmers,
households and small firms). Thus, the credit squeeze decreased aggregate
demand and turned the 1929-30 recession into the Great Depression.
There is an interesting relationship between what happened during the 1920-
30s in the U S. economy and the 1970-80s period for U.S. agriculture. In both
cases, the demisetof the latter decade (1930s and 1980s) was preceded by a huge
increase in borrowing. Charles Persons documented the huge debt expansion of
the 1920s.
Corporate bonds and notes increased 80 percent
• NojyfederaTpjiblic securities grew 185 percent
V / (
Urban, real estate mortgages increased 145 percent.
This is exactly the kind of huge increase in debt level that occurred in agriculture
during the 1970s when farmers nominal aggregate debt increased over 242 percent.
Financial Ratios as Predictors of Financial Stress
One of the implicit assumptions that will be made in this study is that
financial ratios can be used to predict financial stress and failure. This assumption
is supported by several previous studies. Beaver (1966) empirically looked at
whether financial ratios were actually good predictors of failure. He found the
evidence overwhelmingly suggests that there is a difference in the ratios of failed
and nonfailed firms. Also, the difference in ratios between failed and nonfailed
firms was evident at least five years before failure, with the difference increasing
as the year of failure approaches.
Beaver cited three other ratio studies that reached similar conclusions. First,
FitzPatrick (1932) published a study of nineteen pairs of failed and nonfailed.
firms. His results indicated that there were persistent differences in the ratios for
at least three years prior to failure. Second, Winakor and Smith (1935)
investigated the mean ratios of failed firms for ten years prior to failure and found
a marked deterioration in the mean values with the rate of deterioration increasing
as failure approached. Finally, Merwin (1942) compared the mean ratios of
continuing firms with those of discontinued firms for the period of 1926 to 1936.
He found mean differences for as much as six years before discontinuance.
Altman used a set of financial and economic ratios in an attempt to predict
bankruptcies of manufacturing corporations. Multiple discriminant analysis was
chosen as the statistical technique. The following explanatory variables were
found to be significant: (1) working capital/total assets, (2) market value
equity/book value of total debt, (3) retained eamings/total assets, (4) sales/total
assets, and (5) earnings before interest and taxes/total assets. Altman found that
bankruptcy\can be accurately predicted up to two years prior to actual failure with
the accuracy diminishing rapidly after the second year.
Pennon (1917) argued for the use of additional indicators of financial stress
in agriculture, besides the debt-to-asset ratio. His research concluded that three
indicators (times-interest-eame^atiOrJinjUiciaHeverage index, and debt burden
ratio) of financial stress suggested that farmers ability ^service their farm debt
deteriorated long before the debt-to-asset ratio began to rise in the 1980s. For
example, the debt-to-asset ratio varied less than two percent during 1970s, while
times interest earned fell 80 percent from 1973 to 1980.
Theoretical Considerations
To begin with, financial stress needs to be defined As stated in Jolly et
a!., financial stress occurs when the capacity of an individual, a firm or a specific
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sector of the economy to adjust to the forces causing stress is exceeded. Some
stress is found in periods of growth. However, the extreme leve) of financial
stress that occurred in agriculture during the 19S0s was clearly unrelated to
growth.
Jolly tt al. also notes that there are few ambiguous measures of financial
stress. Therefore, it is wise to consider several measures simultaneously when
analyzing regional financial stress. Six measures of financial stress will be
utilized in this study. Two of these six (percent of farm loan volume delinquent
30 days or more and percent of farmers who went bankrupt) will require
econometric analysis prior to the simulation of alternative economic environments
using AG-GEM.
The other four measures (times interest earned ratio, debt burden ratio,
financial leverageddex and debt-to-asset ratio) are definitional and will be
computed directly from projected sector financial statements projected by AG*
GEM. In fact, historical trends in the times interest earned ratio and the debt
burden ratio will be investigated as potential explanatory variables in the
econometric analysis of past dues and bankruptcies.
Definitions and Lindunions of Financial Stress Measures
This section discusses three categories of financial measures often used in
analyzing the level of financial stress. These categories are profitability, leverage,
and the ability to service 'debt. Different measures within each category are
defined Also, their purpose and limitations are explained
Profitability
Profitability is the essential key to the long term viability of any individual
farm or the farm sector. Thus, one would expect a negative relationship between
measures of profitability and measures of financial stress. The following three
measures of profitability were considered in this study: real net cash farm income,
return on assets, and return on equity.
In computing real net cash farm income (hereafier called real net income),
nominal net cash farm income (published by the USDA-ERS) will be deflated by
the Gross Domestic Price deflator with 1987 as the base year. The affect of
inflation on the purchasing power of money is accounted for by using real, instead
of nominal, net income. ~One of the problems with using the level of real net
income is that it is an absolute measure of profitability. Thus, it does not allow
for the possibility of scale differences between the regions or the level of capital
required to produce this level of profit
Ideally, one would prefer to have net income data calculated using the
accrual method of accounting as it provides a more accurate picture of when
revenues were earned and expenses incurred (Barry, Hopkin and Baker)
Published financial statements for the sector as a whole are based on the cash
method Thus, revenue and expenses are recognized at the time cash is
exchanged^ Since these accounts are available on an annual basis only, however,
the difference between measures of profitability and efficiency are lessened
Return on assets (ROA) measures the farm sector's ability to generate
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profits through the use of its assets. A common definition of ROA is net farm
income before interest and income taxes less a charge for unpaid operator and
family labor, all divided by total assets (using either beginning, ending or average
total assets for the year).
Measuring net income before interest expense eliminates the influence of
the method of financing on profitability. Subtracting unpaid labor recognizes the
opportunity cost associated with the labor provided by the operator and his family.
Since, aggregate data on unpaid labor does not exist, return on assets in this study
is defined as:
Net Cash Farm Income + Farm Interest Expense
(1) ROA
Ending Total Assets
One might think that ROA would varying depending on whether the beginning or
ending value of total assets was utilized ifl its calculation. However, this study
found that regardless of which total asset values were used, ROA differed less
than one percent 81.74 percent of the time from 1971 to 1993. In fact, the largest
difference never reached three percent in any region.
Return on Equity (ROE) measures the return to farmers* equity capital
investment. On average, the ROE should exceed the ROA as owners have a
higher level of risk than lenders. Owners higher risk results from lenders priority
in receiving payment (principal and interest) on their capital investment and
lenders must be satisfied first in the event of bankruptcy. For this study, the ROE
is defined as:
Net Cash Farm Income
(2) ROE
Ending Net Worth
Unpaid labor is not subtracted from the numerator, because of the lack of available
data. As with ROA, it was found that ROE varied little, regardless of whether
beginning or ending values were used in the denominator. The greatest difference
between the two formulas for ROE was 3.23 percent and it was the only variation
above three percent.
As indicators of fajm profitability; both the ROA and ROE are thought to
represent reasonably good measures of an industry's operating effectiveness
(Foster). However, both measures can vary due to the accounting method used
in the estimation of assets and liabilities The two valuation methods are "cost"
(a k a. "book value") and "market value". Under the cost method, land (and other
non-depreciable assets) is valued at its purchase price (i e. cost), while under the
market value approach land is valued at its current market price.
Thus, during periods of declining (rising) market values df farm assets, the
ROA and ROE measures are unaffected under the cost method of accounting.
However, if assets are valued under the market method, both measures can
overstate (understate) the operating effectiveness of farmers in periods of declining
(rising) asset values. The problem lies in changes in the market value of equity
of farm assets that are often largely attributable to unrealizet^cquity gains or
losses associated with changing land values, rather than realized gains or losses
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associated with net income (Penson).
This problem is evident in Figure 2.1 which provides a comparison
between real net cash income and the ROE in the Com Belt region. Notice that
ROE was higher in the mid* to late- 1980s than in the mid- to late- 1970s, even
though real net income was lower in the 1980s. This is due to the loss in owners'
equity resulting from the rapid fall of farm asset values in the 1980s. Figure 2.2
demonstrates that the ROA can also be a poor measure of profitability during
periods of falling farm asset values like the 1980s. Thus, one would expect both
the ROA and ROE to be poor indicators of regional financial stress in the 1980s
as huge variations occurred in the market values of assets during this time period.
Leverage
Leverage, or solvency, ratios indicate the degree to which borrowed capital
is used to supplement and extend equity capital. These ratios also indicate the
financial risk exposure of the farm sector at a. specific point in time. Financial
risk is the added variability of returns arising from the fixed obligations associated
with debt financing and cash leasing as forms of financial leveraging. Higher
leverage magnifies the affects of changes in business risk on financial stress.
Business risk is the risk confronted by the firm (such as yield, input price and
output price risk) independent of its financial structure.
When the farm sector carries a high debt load, it increases the risk of loan







Figure 2.1. Companion of Real Net Cash Farm Income and ROE





Figure 2 2 Comparison of Real Net Cash Farm Income and ROA
for the Com Belt Region. 1970-93 (USDA-ERS 1994d)
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higher current payment obligations, reduces credit reserves, and may lead to higher
interest rates. Leverage, however, also can be a key factor in a farm's growth.
Expected returns to equity holders are magnified through higher leverage.
However, the downside affect can outweigh the upside affect, due to the fixed
obligations to service debt (Oltxnans 1990).
The debt-to-asset (D/A) and debt-to-equity (D/E) ratios are commonly used
measure of solvency. Both ratios measure the relationship between the capital
supplied by farm lenders (debt) and capital provided by the farmers (equity). As
either ratio increases, so does the level of financial risk as lenders must be paid
before equity owners in the event of bankruptcy.
Historically, the debt-to-asset ratio has been the most widely used measure
of financial stress. However, several articles (Penson 1987; Lins, Ellinger and
Lattz) have pointed out numerous deficiencies of using the D/A ratio as a measure
of financial stress, especially when it is used as the sole measure. One of the
problems of the D/A ratio as a measure of financial stress lies in the choice of
accounting method used in the estimation of assets and liabilities. Valuation at
"cost" or "book value" may yield a significantly different D/A ratio than a "market
value" approach. Thus, during time of periods of rapid increases in land values,
land owners D/A ratio will be less under the market method than the cost
method.
This was especially evident during the 1970s when the market value of U S.
farmers' real asset value increased over 73 percent. Under the market value
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approach, farmers' assets value increased enough to keep the D/A ratio basically
constant, even though farmers increased their real debt level $95 billion in the
1970s. This result stands in stark contrast to the rapid rise in the D/A ratio that
would have occurred if farm assets were appraised using the cost method.
In addition, Lins points out that the D/A ratio reveals little about the
potential of the farm firm to generate income. If a farm's rate of return on assets
exceeds its cost of debt, then a high D/A ratio represents an appropriate decision
to benefit from a profitable operation. Thus, this ratio used alone is not capable
of signalling financial stress
The financial leverage index (FLI) uses the concepts of the return on equity
and return on assets to overcome some of the problems in measuring and
interpreting these rates of return, when assets are measured at market value
'




If the value of the FLI is above one, earnings per dollar of equity capital exceed
the earnings per dollar on both equity and debt capital. This wouM imply that
farmers are using leverage beneficially (i e returns from debt capital exceed the
cost of debt capital).
Oilmans (1990) stated that a problem existed with using FLI to estimate
financial stress He argued the problem was apparent when FLI was broken down
into its component parts Oltmans stated that FLI is comprised of a balance sheet
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leverage measure (D/E) and an income statement coverage measure (TIE). He
stated that FLI can increase (a desirable situation) as a result of leverage (D/fe)
increasing and interest coverage (TIE) decreasing. In other words, FLI could
signal an improving situation even when financial risk was actually increasing.
He also noted that FLI has no meaning if both ROA and ROE are negative and
that FLI is undefined if ROA equals zero.
Debt Service
The times interest earned (TIE) ratio in this study was calculated as:
(Net Cash Farm Income + Farm Interest Expense)
(7) he = *
Farm Interest Expense
This ratio measures the farm sector's ability to pay interest obligations on their
borrowed capital out of operating profit. An inability to meet these obligations
will ultimately result in bankruptcy or foreclosure.
As TIE increases, farmers have an increased ability to meet all interest
obligations and the likelihood of bankruptcy decreases. Thus, there is a negative
relationship between financial stress and TIE. A weakness of TIE is that it only
considers the interest obligation o:, outstanding debt and does not address the need
to repay the outstanding principal.
Financial lending institutions calculate ratios to measure a borrower's ability
to repay both principal and interest. A common debt coverage measure is (Net
Cash Farm Income minus family living expenses minus Income Taxes plus
Nonfarm Incorie) / (Principal and Interest Payments). However, data limitations
require a modification to this ratio. Family living expenses, income taxes,
nonfarm income, and principal payment data are not available at the aggregate
level. Therefore, a proxy for this debt coverage measure is used.
The debt burden (DNI) ratio for this study is defined as:
Total Liabilities
(8) DNI °
Net Cash Farm Income
The debt burden ratio is a means of assessing the burden placed upon working
capital from operations to retire debt obligations (Foster). Financial stress is
positively related to this ratio. As this ratio increases, farmers face increased*
pressure in meeting their debt repayment obligations; the size of their debt
relative to their ability to service this debt has increased Table 2.1 summarizes
the variables that will be considered in the initial model specification* and
estimation.
Other Measures
Some common measures of financial condition could not be calculated due
to lack of data These include liquidity measures (current ratio, working capital),
as well as asset management ratios (inventory turnover). Government farm
program payments have been considered as a possible explanatory variable in
previous studies. However, for this study it was included in net cash farm income,
due to the need to minimize the number of independent variables in the model.





PROFITABILITY Real Net Cash Farm Income RNI .
Return on Assets ROA -
Return on Equity ROE -
LEVERAGE Debt-to*Asset Ratio D/A +
DebMo-Equity Ratio D/E +
Financial Leverage Index FLI -
DEBT SERVICE Times Interest Earned Ratio TIE •
Debt Burden Ratio DN1 +
’Financial stress is measured as the percent of farm loan volume delinquent 30
days or more at a financial institution and percent of farmers in the institution's
lending area who filed for bankruptcy.
Summary
As previous authors have emphasized, it is important to consider several
different financial measures when analyzing financial stress. When viewed in
isolation, each measure suffers from a myopic view. However, when these
measures are jointly considered, their combined explanatory power is greatly
improved.
CHAPTER ni
MODEL ESTIMATION AND VALIDATION
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to report the coefficient estimates developed
in this study and discuss the results of various methods used to validate the
regional financial stress model. The first section outlines this study's model,
explains the attumptkJfo for its selection and reports the results from the test of
these assumptions. The second section details validation methods, the model's
coefficient estimates, their statistical significance, R: and test results for
autocorrelation. Next, a test for structural change is developed. The fourth
section reports the results of forecasting the model using within sample data. The
final section summarizes the contents of this chapter.
\ It is important to be very specific regarding the intended purpose of this
study's model. The regional financial stress model was developed as a predictive
model for use in policy analysis. Thus, the specific purpose of the model is to
provide information regarding the regional impact various policy alternatives
would hav^ on farmers debt service ability and survivability. Therefore,
establishing the trend and direction of change is more important than making
specific forecast that might serve as an input to an aggregative credit scoring
model. It is hoped that policymakers and others can analyze the model results to
evaluate the potential affects of various policy alternatives.
Rational Fiuncial Stress Model and Assumptions
The model used to project regional financial stress was estimated using the
following system of ten equations (two equations for each of five regions):
(1) PDtl B f (Lagged PDU , Times-Interest-Eamed Ratiou )
(2) Bu * f ( Lagged Bu , Lagged Debt Burden Ratiou )
where:
PDU is percent of farm loans past due 30 days or more in region i
(i« West, Plains, Northeast, Com Belt and Soutlj) at time t (t« 1982-1993).
Bu is percent of farmers in bank lending area who went bankrupt in
region i (i "West, Plains, Northeast, Com Belt and South) at time t
(t=* 1982-1993).
Times-Interest-Eamed Ratio and Debt Burden Ratio were defined earlier
in equations (7) and (8) on pages 31 and 32.
These ten equations were estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR).
SUR was chosen based on two initial assumptions: the error terms between
regions were correlated and coefficients varied across regions. Both of these
assumptions were tested.
The Breusch-Pagan LM test (see Kmenta Ch. 8) was performed to test the
null hypothesis that the error terms were not correlated between regions. jThis null
hypothesis was rejected as the test statistic (122.66) was greater than the ^ritical
value (50.892) at a significance level of 0 01. Thus, it is assumed that the error
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terms are correlated. This assumption is appealing since one would expect that
a random shock not accounted for in the model that afTected one region, should
also affect other regions. Because the error terms were correlated. Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression could not be used as OLS assumes the error terms are
independent.
The second assumption tested was that coefficients varied across regions. It
was hypothesized that coefficients should vary across regions, due to explanatory
variables having varying impacts across regions. For example, in a regional model
predicting past due loans, one might expect the times interest earned ratio's
coefficient to vary between the regions with the highest and lowest levels of debt.
The null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same for all regions was tested.
All four independent variables' coefficients were statistically different across
regions at an alpha level of 0.05. Thus, data could not be pooled, because pooling
does not allow the coefficients to vary across regions. .
Results of Model Estimation
Model validation is important in any empirical analysis. However, there are
many approaches to model validation and validation is fundamentally subjective.
McCarl and Apland discuss some of the inherent problems with model validation
Modelers choose the validity tests, the criteria for passing the tests, what model
outputs to validate, what setting to test in, what data to use, etc. Thus, the
assertion "the model was judged valid" can mean almost anything Nonetheless,
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a model validation effort reveals a model's strengths and weaknesses which is
valuable to users and those who obtain information from model results. The
ultimate test of validity deals with adoption of the model by the decision
maker.
In this study, model validation will consist of checking for proper signs and
statistical significance of coefficients and forecasting the model. Due to the
limited number of observations for the dependent variables, all twelve years of
data wilt .be used in model estimation Therefore,, the model will only be
forecasted using within sample data.
All variables were transformed into logs, so that differences in coefficient
values caused by scaling were eliminated and coefficients can be interpreted as
elasticities. However, it should be noted that with elasticities one assumes the
coefficients are constant over time. If the numbers were in "natural terms" the
elasticities could change over time.
The coefficient estimates for each of the five regions' past due and bankruptcy
equations are listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. All of the variables were
statistically significant (alpha * 0.0$) and of proper sign. The R3 coefficient (also
reported in Tables 3.1 and 3.2) measures how much of the total variation in the
dependent variable that the model explains. Thus, the regional past due equations
explained between 64 and 84 percent of the variation in regional past dues. The
regional bankruptcy equations explained between 48 and 86 percent of the
variability in regional bankruptcies.
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As expected, a positive relationship exists between the dependent variables
(past dues and bankruptcies) and the lag of these variables (i.e. LPD and LB).
The times interest earned ratio (Tl) coefficients are all negative; this ratio should
have a negative relationship with past due loans, as the more "times" one is able
to cover interest expense the less likely one is to be delinquent on loan repayment.
Table 3.1. Past Due Model Regrg^on Coefficients*
Wen PUini Northeast Corn Bell South
Intercept 26307 1 547! 2 3482 1.3717 2.9379
(10 99) (4.15) (496) (5.35) (15.19)
LPD .15157 .49645 .35716 64427 .13239
(2.33) (4 35) (3.39) (6.94) (302) ,
Tl •1.1395 •85322 •10955 • 9316 •1.3845
(-855) (-4 17) (•4.03) (-5.35) (-14.43)
R’ .78 84 64 .81 .74
Durbin-h .87 28 58 .86 .10
* All coefficients are of proper sign and significant at the 0.05 level. T-Ratios are
in parenthesis.
A positive correlation between bankruptcy and the lag of the debt burden ratio
(LDNI) is expected. As the ratio of farm debt to net cash farm income increases,
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so does the probability that the farmer will be unable to meet all his long-term
obligations (especially principal payments), resulting in bankruptcy. All debt
burden ratio coefficients are positive in the five bankruptcy equations.
Table 3.2 . Bankruptcy Model Regression Coefficients*
West Plains Northeast Corn Belt South
Intercept * 14908 ♦ 15529 •38814 *62365 ♦5075
(-055) (•052) (•234) (•304) (•351)
IB .44765 .38605 .52803 63667 .29855
(5.79) (3 55) (7.44) (6.46) (13 58)
LDNI .5569 .40486 10049 63419 v 1.3102
(267) (195) (608) (543) (1043)
R> .58 .48 .78 66 .86
Durbin-h 47 .30 1.05 •15 •14
0 All coefficients are of proper sign and significant at the 0.05 level. T-Ratios
are in parenthesis.
Given the time series nature of the data, tests for autocorrelation were
performed. Since both the past due and bankruptcy equations included a lagged
dependent variable, the Durbin-h test for autocorrelation was used. The results of
this test are reported in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. In all cases, the test statistics were
well below the critical value (1.645) at a significance level of 0.05. Thus,
autocorrelation is not present in any of'the ten equations.
Test for Structural Change
After specification of the regional equations was completed, a test was
developed to try and dratf some inferences about the affect of not having 1970s
data on the dependent variables at the regional level. The test was comprised of
the following steps:
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1) Develop the regional model for past dues using data from 1982-93.
2) Develop a national model using the same independent variables (i.e.
lagged past dues and times interest earned ratio) the regional model
used. National model's coefficients were all proper sign, statistically
significant (alpha * 0.05), R2 » 0.84 and no autocorrelation.
3) Find a proxy for past dues, as data on past dues is only available from
1982-93.
4) Regress percent of loans past due on the allowance for loan losses as
a percentage of total loans (this is the proxy) for the period 1982-93.
The correlation was 91.24 percent. So, allowance for loan losses as a
percentage of total loans was used as a proxy for percent of loans past
due in the national model.
%
5) Run a Chow test to determine if the coefficients are statistically
different between a national model estimated with data from 1971-82,
versus, 1983-1993. Result: Failed to reject null hypothesis that
coefficients do not differ. Chow * 2.73 < 3.2 * F distribution with
DF1* 3 and DF2 - 17, at alpha - .05.
Thus, the coefficients were not statistically different between the two time periods
(1971-82 and 1983*1993) in the national model. Therefore, it is entirely possible
that the current regional model's coefficients would not be significantly different
even if 1970s data on pari dues had been available and used to estimate the
regional model.
Forecasting Regional Model Using Within Sample Data
Ideally, one would like to have enough observations to split them into two
sets: within- sample data and out-of-sample data. Within-sample data is normally
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used to estimate the model. Next, the model is forecast using out-of-sample data.
I
One form of model validation is to then compare how closely the models
projections matched the actual historical outcomes contained in the out-of-sample
data. Unfortunately, for this study, there simply are not enough years of data
available to divide the sample and perform out-of-sample forecasts. This data
deficiency stems from the fact that before the early 1980s, information regarding
two of this study's measures of regional financial stress in agriculture (past dues
and bankruptcies) was not collected and published. Thus, all twelve years of data
(1982-93) were used to estimate this study's model.
Due to these data limitations, a weaker form of model validation was
utilized. This validation process involved examining the results of forecasting this
study's model within sample, using the same data that was used to estimate the
model. If the model performs poorly here, it is highly unlikely it will be able to
successfully predict future outcomes
Forecasted results are presented in this chapter in table form for each of the
five regions. They are also presented graphically in the appendix (Figures B1 •
BIO). The tables present a comparison between the regional forecast results and
the actual past dues and bankruptcies that occurred from 1983-19^3.
One of the main objectives of this study's model inhe-abimy to predict the
trends and changes in the direction of past dues and bankruptcies. Based on this
criteria, a prediction was considered accurate if its yearly change in direction
matched the actual value's change in direction. For instance, if the model
predicted past dues in the West region would decrease from 1987 to 1988 and past
dues actually did decrease, then the model's projection for 1988 was considered
acceptable. Forecasts were also considered accurate if they were within ten
percent ( + or -) of the actual value.
Based on this criteria, the past due models' forecasts for both the West and
Com Belt regions were accurate for nine of the eleven years forecast. The Plains,
Northeast and South were projected correctly for seven, six and five years,
respectively. Of the 5$ years forecast (i.e., 11 years * 5 regions) for past dues,
36 years were forecast correctly (6$ percent). The past due model performed
poorest during the period 1985-1986 when past dues were at their peak. None of
the regional models forecasts were correct in 1985 and only two (West and Com
Belt) were accurate in 1986. Tables 3.3 • 3.7 provide within sample forecasts for
each of the individual region's (West, Plains, Northeast, Com Belt and South) past
dues and bankruptcies.
In forecasting bankruptcies, the highest accuracy was achieved in the
Northeast region (nine years correct) while the worst was in the Com Belt with
only six years forecast correctly. The remaining three regions (West, Plains and
South) were all forecast correctly eight times. Thus, despite the low R: for both
the West and Plains region model (.58 and .48, respectively), these regions'
forecasts were accurate over 72 percent of the time. Of the 55 years forecast (i.e
II years * 5 regions) for bankruptcies, 39 years were forecast correctly (71
percent). The bankruptcy model performed worst during the period 1992*1993.
Two of the regional models forecasts were correct in 1992 (West and Northeast)
and only one (South) was accurate in 1993.
Summary
This chapter reported the coefficient estimates for both the past due and
bankruptcy models. The regional past due equations explained between 64 and
84 percent of the variation in regional past dues. The regional bankruptcy
equations explained between 48 and 86 percent of the variation in regional
bankruptcies. The coefficient estimates in both models were all found to be of
proper sign and statistically significant. Tests for autocorrelation and structural
change were negative.











1983 4,5 5.9 1.2 1.5
19^4 5.0 5.1 * 2.3 2.5 •
1985 8.0 4.8 3.5 3.0 ♦
1986 5.2 4.1 ♦ V5 3.4 •
1987 3.2 3.1 • 3.0 2.9 *
1988 2.3 26 • 2.0 2.4 •
1989 1.6 2.2 • 2.1 1.9 *
1990 1.4 2.0 ♦ 1.3 1.9
1991 3.0 2.1 • 1.2 1.5 •
1992 2.0 1.9 * 2.9 1.6 *
1993 1.4 1.6 • 2.8 22
• Represents predicted values within 10 percent (+ or -) ofactual values and/or
changes in the direction of predicted values that match actual values changes
in direction.











I983\ 3.5 4.0 0.9 16
1984 4.1 4.0 • 2.3 1.7 •
1985 4.4 3.5 3.7 2.5 •
1986 6.6 3.5 3.9 2.6 •
1987 2.9 3.6 2.6 2.5 ' ♦
1988 1.9 2.3 • 2.0 20 •
1989 1.7 1.9 • 1.9 18 •
1990 1.4 1.6 • 0.8 1.7 •
1991 1.4 1.3 • 1.3 1.2 •
1992 1.0 1.2 # 1.1 1.4
1993 1.0 0.9 • 1.6 1.3
* Represents predicted values within 10 percent (+ or •) of actual values
and/or changes in the direction of predicted values that match actual values
changes in direction.
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1983 3.5 4.5 1.0 1.3
1984 5.3 5.1 • 2.6 2.2 ♦
1985 6.9 4.0 4.0 3.8 *
1986 69 32 3.9 3.4 •
1987 2.9 2.5 • 3.3 2.9 •
1988 1.4 2.3 • 2.4 2.2 •
1989 1.9 2.3 1.5 2.0 •
1990 1.6 2.3 1.2 16 •
1991 2.5 2.3 • 1.4 1.5 •
1992 1.5 20 • 1.5 1.7 •
1993 1.8 1.8 • 2.5 1.6
• Represents predicted values within 10 percent (+ or -) of actual values
and/or changes in the direction of predicted values that match actual values
changes in direction.











1983 3.5 3.8 • * 1.0 1.4
1984 43 4.3 • 2.3 1.5 •
1985 5.2 3.2 3.3 3.3 •
1986 5.4 3.4 # 40 2.7
1987 2.3 2.9 • 3.4 2.9
1988 1.5 1.9 • 2.0 2.2 •
1989 1.1 1.6 * • 1.5 • 1.8 •
1990 1.1 1.1 • 1.1 1.7 *
1991 1.5 • 1.2 • 1.3 1.2 •
1992 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.5
1993 1.0 0.9 1.7 1.3
* Represents predicted values within 10 percent (+ or •) of actual values and/or
changes in the direction of predicted values that match actual values changes
in direction.
















1984 4.0 4.2 • 4.9 5.5 •
1985 4.2 3.2 5.7 5.7 •
1986 5.2 3.1 6.5 48
1987 3.0 2.4 • 59 4.6 0
1988 1.3 . 1.8 * 3.3 3.4 •
1989 1.3 1.5 2.0 2.4 ,♦
1990 0.8 1.5 1.2 1.8 •
1991 2.1 1.2 2.3 1.6
1992 1.2 1.1 • 1.8 2.0
1993 0.7 1.0 • 1.6 1.6 •
* Represents predicted values within 10 percent (+ or •) of actual values and/or





The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the regional resutts from four policy
scenarios using six measures of financial stress. Results are analyzed by
comparing regional financial stress measures from each of three scenarios to a
baseline scenario. For this study, the baseline scenario assumes that the CRP is
eliminated. The other three scenarios being .compared to the baseline are: (1) a
continuation of CRP, (2) a ten percent reduction in target prices, and (3) a two
percent reduction in the growth rate of the money supply. All of the scenarios are
projected from 1994 to 2009
Two of the six measures of financial stress analyzed are the percentage of
agricultural bank loans to farmers that are 30 days or more past due and the
percentage of farmers within an agricultural bank's lending area that went bankrupt
during the period. These two measures were projected using equations that are
explained in Chapter III. The other measures calculated are: the times-interest-
earned ratio, the debt burden ratio, the financial leverage index, and the debt-to*
asset ratio. Since all six of the above measures are based on projections made by
the AG-GEM simulation model, the following section discusses the assumptions
underlying the model's projections.
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AG-GEM Assumptions
The following five variables were projected under each of the four scenarios
over the 1994*2000 period by the AG-GEM simulation model:
• net cash farm income
• total farm assets
• total farm debt
• total farm interest expense
• government farm program costs
Each of the four scenarios assumed:
• Target prices remain frozen to the year 2000, except for the one scenario
where target prices are reduced by ten percent.
• Costs of production increase roughly with the rate of inflation. Thus,
frozen nominal target prices and rising costs result in a price squeeze that
tends to cause farmers' net income to fall.
• A moderately "strong" dollar that dampens export growth. The dollar is
even stronger under the one scenario that slo\ys the growth rate of the
money supply by two percent.
• CRP is eliminated (except for CRP continuation scenario), with 75 percent
of CRP land coming back into production. This increases the supply of
farm program crops (wheat, feedgrains, etc.) causing market prices to fall.
This causes deficiency payments to increase.
The return of CRP land to production, coupled with lower net returns to
farmers, will cause farm asset values (mainly land) to fall slightly. Farmers debt




Currently, considerable debate exists over >vhether the CRP should be
eliminated (baseline) or continued. Participants on both sides of the debate should
be interested in analyzing the financial stress projections from both scenarios.
However, before comparing the financial stress projections from these scenarios
related to CRP, a brief description of the CRP is provided.
The CRP was established by Congress in the 1985 Farm Act as a voluntary
long-term cropland retirement program. About eight percent of U S. cropland
(36.4 million acres) has been enrolled in the CRP in 12 separate signups during
the March 1986 to June 1992 time period. The USDA provides CRP participants
with half the cost of establishing a permanent land cover (usually grass or trees)
and an annual per-acre rental in exchange for retiring highly erodible or other
environmentally sensitive cropland for ten years (USDA-ERS).
CRP acres are concentrated largely in the Plains and western portion of Com
Belt regions defined in this study. Nearly 60 percent of the CRP acreage
scheduled to come back into production in 1996-1999 is located in these regions.
The annual CRP rental payments made by USDA to participating farmers total
$1.8 billion and average $50 per acre.
Contracts covering two million CRP acres were originally scheduled to
expire in 1995, but these contracts were extended one year. Additional contracts
on more than 22 million acres will expire in 1996 and 1997. Recent surveys by
the Soil and Water Conservation Society (SWCS) indicate that without CRP
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extensions, fanners would return 54 to 74 percent of their CRP acres to crop
production, depending on commodity prices. (USDA-ERS). Thus, the expiration
i
of CRP contracts raises several issues, including the ultimate affects a return of
CRP land to production will have on farmers.
Discussion of Baseline Projections
This section begins by discussipg the change from 1994 to 2000 in the five
variables projected by AG-GEM under the baseline scenario. An analysis is then
provided on how these five variables affect the six measures of financial stress
examined in this study.
Major Farm Sector Variables
Total Farm Assets. At the U.S. level, farm asset values fall $21.6 billion
(2.5 percent) from 1994 to 2000 under the baseline (CRP eliminated) scenario.
This is mainly due to the return of CRP land to production. This return increases
the amount of land on real estate markets, and thus drives down'farm land values.
The value of farm assets in all but the West region are projected to decrease from
1994 to 2000.
This decrease ranges from a 0.54 percent drop in the South to a 5.12 percent
decline in the Plains. Both the Northeast and Cbm Belt regions' asset values will
fall 4 32 percent. The West region’s asset values will experience a 5.3 percent
growth in asset value from 1994 to 1996. However, when CRP land comes back
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into production (starting in 1997), the West's asset values fall 3.5 percent from
1996 to 2000. Overall, the West experiences a slight growth (1.77 percent) in
asset value from 1994 to 2000.
Total Finn Debt and Interest Expense. Farmers' total debt is projected to
increase a total of $12.8 billion (9.22 percent) from 1994 to 2000 under the
baseline scenario. Some of the land currently held in the CRP is owned by
individuals who do not have the equipment or desire to bring this land back into
production. It is expected that some of the CRP land will be sold when CRP
contracts expire. Thus, debt increases because farmers borrow to purchase land
formerly owned by CRP participants and make the capital expenditures necessary
to bring this land back into production.
The percentage increase in debt (from 1994 to *2000) ranges from 5.48
percent in the Com Belt to 12.6 percent in the South. The other regions
(Northeast, Plains and West) debt increased by 6.4, 9.18 and 11.21 percent,
respectively. Although farm debt increases modestly, farm interest expense
increases substantially due to higher interest rates. Farmers in the Plains region
can expect their interest expense to increase 40.7 percent from 1994 to 2000. The
remaining regions all have projected increases between 25.6 (Northeast) and 33.1
(Com Belt) percent.
Government Farm Program Costs Despite the annual $1.8 billion savings
in CRP payments if CRP is eliminated, government farm program costs would
actually increase S4 billion from 1994 to 2000. This increase results from higher
deficiency payments that result from lower market prices for farm program crops.
Crop prices are lower due to CRP land coming back into production which
increases the supply of crops. Farm program payments increase dramatically in
the Plains (70 percent), Northeast (85 percent) and Com Belt (111 percent) if CRP
is eliminated. The West and South receive a 12 and 10 percent increase,
respectively.
Net Ctih Farm Income. Northeast farmers should see an 11 percent (SI.02
billion) decrease in annual net cash farm income by the year 2000. The Plains
and Com Beit regions should experience decreases of 5.04 and 5.96 percent,
respectively. These decreases are mainly the result of a price-cost squeeze. U S.
farmers face a price-cost squeeze resulting from target prices being frozen at 1990
levels, while the costs of production increase roughly with the rate of inflation.
In the year 2000, it is projected that approximately 41 percent of farmers net cash
farm income (in the Plains and Com Belt) will come from government payments.
Only the West and South regions are expected to experience positive growth
in net cash farm income. Net cash farm income is expected to increase $1.33
billion (10.96 percent) in the West and $1.43 billion (8.85 percent) in the South
from 1994 to 2000.. Recall, that these same two regions received the smallest
increase in government payments. Thus, it seems logical to assume that these two
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regions are not as heavily dependent on farm program crops.
Measures of Financial Performance
Debt-to-Asiet Ratio. For all regions, the debt-to-asset ratio increases under
the baseline scenario from 1994 to 2000. This is expected, since debt increased
from 1994 to 2000 in every region. In addition, asset values fell in every region,
except the West. The West's debt-to-asset ratio increased because the 11.2 percent
increase in debt outweighed the 1.77 percent growth in assets (1994 to 2000). The
<•
most noticeable change in the debt-to-asset ratio occurs in 1997. This change
results from asset values starting to fall as CRP land comes back into production.
Figures 4.1 through 4.5 display baseline projections (1994 to 2000) for the six
measures of.financial stress used in this study.
The Northeast region has the lowest projected ending (0.14) debt-to-asset
ratio. The highest leverage ratio occurs in the Plains and South regions. Both
regions debt-to-asset ratios increase from 0.17 to 0.20 (1994 to 2000). The West
and Com Belt leverage ratios start at 0.16 and irfcrease to 0.18 and 0.17,
respectively.
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Figure 4.2. Baseline Financial Stress Measures for the Plains Region
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Figure 4.5. Baseline Financial Stress Measures for the South Region
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Financial Leverage Index. As discussed in Chapter II, the financial leverage
index (FLI) indicates whether or not the use of debt was profitable. If the FLI is
above one, fanners are earning a profit from their use of debt. However, if the
FLI falls below one, it is questionable whether the use of debt represents an
attempt at profit or survival. Since debt is projected to increase in all regions, FLI
can only increase if net cash farm income also increases.
However, net cash farm income only increases in the West and South
regions. Thus, the Plains, Northeast and Com Belt have a decrease in their FLI.
In alt three of these regions, FLI is below one from 1994 to 2000 The Com Belt
has the lowest FLI of all regions by the year 2000 (0.85) Although the West’s
net income increases (10$6 percent), its 28.4 percent increase in interest expense
causes FLI to fall slightly from 1.01 to I. Thus, only the South region’s FLI
increases (1.07 to 1.08) from 1994 to 2000.
Times-Interest-Earned Ratio and Past Dues. Recall net cash farm income
growth was negative in the Plains, Northeast and Com Belt regions. Also, interest
expense grew rapidly in these regions. Since the times-interest-eamed (TIE) ratio
is comprised solely of net cash farm income and farm interest expense, it is
obvious that the above three regions will experience decreasing TIE ratios.
Although the South and West regions experience income growth, rapidly
increasing interest expense also causes these regions TIE ratios to fall. The
increase in interest expense is caused by rising interest rates Throughout the
59
projected time period, the South will have the highest TIE ratio (7.4 in the year
2000). The lowest TIE ratios are projected (in the year 2000) in the Plains (3.4)
and Com Belt (3.3) regions.
Past dues are a function of lagged past dues and the TIE ratio. Thus, the
projected fall in TIE for all regions results in increased past dues in every region.
Past dues are projected to increase from 1.7 percent to 2.1 percent by the year
2000 in the West region. This level is mild in comparison with the levels present
in the 1980s (i.e., 6 percent in 1986).
The Plains region experiences the largest percentage increase (85 percent) in
past dues, since it also experienced the largest percentage decrease (26 percent)
in the TIE ratio. Both the Northeast and Com Belt regions will experience
approximately a 50 percent increase in past dues from 1994 to 2000. The South
is expected to have the lowest levels of past dues during this time period (1.2
percent in the year 2000).
Debt Burden Ratio nd Bankruptcies The debt burden ratio (total farm debt/
net cash farm income) will increase if debt growth exceeds the growth in net cash
farm income. Debt is projected to increase in all five regions. Since net cash
a
farm income growth is negative in three regions (Plains, Northeast and Com Belt),
/
these regions' debt burden ratios will increase. The South region's debt burden
ratio also increases slightly (1.77 to 1.83), because debt growth exceeds the
growth in net cash farm income. The West region's debt burden ratio, despite
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being lower from 1995 lo 1999, will end where it began at 2.5.
Bankruptcies are a function of their own lag and the lag of the debt burden
ratio. Thus, the Plains, Com Belt and South regions' bankruptcies increase (26
percent, 13 percent, and 15 percent, respectively) due to the higher debt burden
ratios. Bankruptcy rates fall 14 percent in the West region from 1994 to 2000.
This region's debt burden ratio varied less than 3 percent during this time period.
The Northeast experiences a 32 percent decrease (from 3.1 to 2.1 percent)
in bankruptcy even though the debt burden ratio increases 20 percent from 1994
to 2000. The reason for this anomaly is that bankruptcies fall the most (from 3.1
to 2.3 percent) from 1994 to 1995. This decrease occurs one year after the debt
burden ratio falls 35 percent. Bankruptcies are unchanged from 1996 to 2000 as
the debt burden ratio varies less than 8 percent from 1995 to 1999.
Discussion of Projections under CRP Continuation
This section starts by outlining the change from 1994 to 2000 in the five
variables projected by AG-GEM under the CRP continuation scenario. An
explanation is then given on how these variables affect the six measures of
regional financial stress in relation to the baseline.
M^jor Farm Sector Variables
Total Farm Assets. Unlike the projected decrease in U S farm asset values
that occur in the baseline, asset values will increase if CRP is continued. Asset
values are higher than the baseline, because CRP land does not re-enter the
market. U S. farm asset values will increase $72.8 billion (8.3 percent) from 1994
to 2000 if CRP is continued. Asset values in all five regions grow mainly due to
rising land values. The greatest increases from 1994 to 2000, occur in the West
(12.72 percent) and South (11.51 percent) regions. The remaining regions (Plains,
Northeast and Com Belt) experience between a 5.15 to 6.72 percent growth in
asset value.
Total Faim Debt and Interest Expense. If the CRP is continued, farmers will
expand their use of debt by 11.6 percent ($16.25 billion) from 1994 to 2000. The
largest percentage growth in debt will occur in the South (15.2 percent), West
(13.4 percent) and Plains (11.73 percent) regions. Debt in the Northeast and Com
Belt regions increases 8.86 and 7.77 percent, respectively.
Increased debt levels result in higher interest expenses. As in the baseline,
higher interest rates* cause the percentage growth in interest expense to exceed the
percentage increase in debt Interest expense growth from 1994 to 2000 ranges
from 28.49 percent in the Northeast to 43.98 percent in the Plains The remaining
regions' interest expenses increase between 30.95 percent (South) and 36 percent
(Com Belt).
Government Farm Progriun Costs. Overall. U S. farm program costs are
projected to increase 11.1 percent ($680 million) from 1994 to 2000. This is
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S3.33 billion below the projected S4 billion increase in the baseline. The West
I
region experiences an 18.4 percent (SI51 million) decrease in government
payments from 1994 to 2000. All of the remaining regions receive higher
payments in the year 2000 than in 1994. The Com Belt and South receive
i
roughly 20 percent more (by the year 2000). The Plains and Northeast regions'
government payments increase 10.74 and 13.84 percent, respectively.
Net Cash Farm Income. U.S. net cash farm income is projected to decrease
approximately 1 percent (S500 million) from 1994 to 2000. As in the baseline
scenario, farmers are caught in the price-cost squeeze of frozen target prices and
increasing costs of production. The Plains, Northeast, and Com Belt are expected
to see decreases in net cash farm income of 13, 11.3, and 13.4 percent,
respectively. The West and South's income are projected to increase 8.6 and 11.2
percent, respectively. These two regions fair better than the other three; because
they derive proportionally less of their income from government payments which
are shrinking in real terms.
Measures of Financial Performance
Debt-to-Asset Ratio. The debt-to-asset ratio changes very little in any
region, because the overall growth rate in U.S. farm assets (8.3 percent) and farm
debt (11.6 percent) are similar. The West and Com Belt regions' leverage ratios
are constant (0.16) from 1994 to 2000 The Plains and South regions’ debt-to-
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asset ratios increase slightly (from 0.17 to 0.18) in 1995 and then remain
unchanged. The Northeast has the lowest leverage ratio throughout the projected
time period (0.13 in the year 2000).
Financial Leverage Index. Since farm debt levels grew in every region, any
region with negative income growth will have a falling financial leverage index.
This occurs in the Plains, Northeast and Com Belt regions, so their FLIs fall (10,
6 and 11 percent, respectively) from 1994 to 2000. The remaining regional (West
and South) FLIs decrease, because their respective income growth rates (8.62 and
11.2 percent) are exceeded by their interest expense growth rates (31 and 32
percent). The Com Belt is projected to have the lowest FLI (0.81 in the year
2000) from 1994 to 2000. Only the South will have an FLI above one (1.06) in
the year 2000.
Times-Interrst-Earaed Ratio and Past Dues. The TIE ratio is projected to
decrease in every region from 1994 to 2000 if CRP is continued. The Plains,
Northeast and Com Belt regional TIE ratio falls, because of falling net income and
increasing interest expense from 1994 to 2000. The West and jouth regions' TIE
ratios decrease, due to interest expense increasing roughly 31 percent, while net
cash farm income only increases about 10 percent from 1994 to 2000. The lowest
TIE ratios are projected (in the year 2000) in the Plains (3.15) and Com Belt
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(3.35) regions. The highest TIE ratio is always claimed by the South (7.43 in the
year 2000).
Since the TIE ratios are projected to decrease in every region, past dues will
increase in all regions from 1994 to 2000. The Plains region experiences the
largest percentage increase (107 percent) in past dues, since it also has the largest
percentage decrease (30 percent) in the TIE ratio. The South will have the lowest
level of delinquencies (1.2 percent in the year 2000), because it had the highest
TIE ratio from 1994 to 2000. The Com Belt and Northeast regions’ past dues
increase 70 and 47 percent, respectively. Past dues in the West increase 24
percent (from 1.7 to 2.1 percent) from 1994 to 2000.
Debt Burden Ratio and Bmkniptcies. The debt burden ratio increases in all
regions from 1994 to 2000. The Plains, Northeast and Com Belt regions' debt
burden ratios increase (28, 23 and 25 percent; respectively), due to increased debt
levels and negative growth in net cash farm income. The West and South's
income growth rate (8.62 and 11.2 percent, respectively) is surpassed by their debt
growth of 13.4 and 15.2 percent (from 1994 to 2000) Thus, both of these regions
debt burden ratio increases approximately 4 percent from 1994 to 2000.
Bankruptcies are driven mainly over time by the lagged debt burden ratio.
Bankruptcies increase in the Plains, Com Belt and South (33.3, 25 and 15 percent,
respectively) from 1994 to 2000, due to higher debt burden ratios. From 1994 to
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2000, bankruptcies in the West and Northeast region decrease (9 and 13 percent,
respectively) even though the debt burden ratio increases. The reason for this is
the same as in the baseline scenario (i.e., the largest decrease in bankruptcy for
these regions occurs in 1995, one year after a sharp decrease in the their debt
burden ratios).
Comparing the Continuation of CRP to Baseline
In comparing measures of financial stress between continuing CRP and the
baseline (CRP eliminated) scenario, one would expect to observe the largest
differences in those regions with the most CRP acreage. Thus, one would expect
significant differences between scenario projections for the West (23 percent of
CRP acreage), Plains (41 percent of CRP acreage) and Com Belt (15 percent of
CRP acreage).
Figures in each of the following sections provide a graphical comparison
between a continuation of CRP and the baseline for the six measures of financial
stress used in this study. Tables (A1 * A5 in the appendix) provide data on annual
levels, annual percentage change and percent deviation from baseline for all six
measures of financial stress.
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J^npact on West Region
Under both scenarios, past dues (delinquencies) are projected to increase
from 1.7 percent of farm borrowers to 2.1 percent by the year 2000 (Figure 4.6).
The level of past dues, however, can be judged as mild by comparison with the
1980s experience. The times-interest-eamed ratio falls approximately 13 percent
(in both scenarios) from 1994 to 2000, suggesting a minor decline in debt service
capacity. This occurs because the 30 percent growth in interest expense exceeds
the eight percent increase in net cash farm income. Interest expense was higher
due to higher interest rates and about a 12 percent increase in farm debt from
1994 to 2000 for both scenarios.
If CRP is continued, bankruptcies are projected to be 5 percent above
baseline in the year 2000. Bankruptcies start to increase above baseline in 1998,
one year after the debt burden ratio increases above baseline. The debt burden
ratio is higher (from 1997 to 2000) if CRP is continued, due to higher debt levels
and lower growth in net cash farm income.






Baseline Scenario — — —
Figure 4.6. Comparing Continuing CRP to Baseline for the West Region
68
The hope of reducing budget outlays by eliminating CRP is unrealized as
farm programs would cost $850 million more (from 1996 - 2000) if CRP is
discontinued. Government costs are higher because the return of CRP land to
production causes an increase in the supply of farm program crops. Increased
supplies drive down farm program crop prices, causing deficiency payments to
increase.
Farm asset values (especially land) are sensitive to the ultimate future of
CRP. If CRP is continued, asset values are $20.8 billion (11 percent) over
baseline levels from 1996 to 2000. Since farm debt differs by only 2 percent
between the two scenarios, the higher projected asset values under the CRP
continuation scenario result in the debt-to-asset ratio being 13 percent below
baseline by the year 2000. The financial leverage index is 2 percent below
baseline (0.98 versus 1) by the year 2000. This occurs because the CRP
continuation scenario experiences slightly less income (and slightly more interest
expense) growth than the baseline.
Impact on Plains Region
Bankruptcies increase 33 percent from 1994 to 2000 and are consistent with
baseline projections (Figure 4.7). The debt burden ratio increases 28 percent, due
v











Basdinc Scenario — — —
Figure 4.7. Comparing Continuing CRP to Baseline for the Plains Region
70
dues are projected to double (1.3 to 2.7 percent) and be 12.3 percent'above
baseline in the year 2000. Increased delinquencies/are traceable to a 30 (26
percent in baseline) percent decline in the TIE ratio. This ratio falls because net
cash farm income declines $1.26 billion if CRP is'continued while interest
expenses increase $1.2 billion.
Total farm program payments arc $4 billion below baseline (from 1994 to
2000) if CRP is continued. Farm asset values are $20 billion (11 percent) above
baseline values by the year 2000. Since debt growth differs by less than 3 percent
between the two scenarios, the higher projected asset values under the CRP
continuation scenario result in the debt-to-asset ratio being 10 percent below
baseline by the year 2000. As in the West, the FLI is slightly less (0.84 versus
0.88) by the year 2000 if CRP is continued. This is again due to lower projected
income and higher projected interest expense than exists in the baseline.
Impact on Northeast Region
Past dues increase in both scenarios by 47 percent from 1994 to 2000 (Figure
4.8). This increase is due to the TIE ratio falling 25 percent regardless of CRP's
fate. As in the Plains, the TIE ratio falls because of decreasing net cash farm
income and higher interest expenses. Interest expenses increase $480 million
($432 million in baseline) from 1994 to 2000, because of higher interest rates and
increased farm jlebt levels.
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Basdinc Scenario — — —
4
figure 4.8. Comparing Continuing CRP to Baseline for the Northeast Region
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After a 32 percent decline in farm bankruptcies from 1994 to 1996,
bankruptcies are almost constant (both scenarios) for the remainder of the decade.
The debt burden ratio increases 23 percent in both scenarios from 1994 to 2000.
This ratio increases due to an 11 percent decrease (both scenarios) in net cash
farm income and a 9 (6.4 for baseline) percent increase in {arm debt. (Recall the
reason why bankruptcies decrease when the debt burden ratio increases in the
Northeast. This explanation is provided in the Baseline Projections: Debt Burden
Ratio and Bankruptcy section.)
From 1994 to 2000, total farm program costs are $1.2 billion below the
baseline if the Conservation Reserve Program is continued. The debt-to-asset ratio
and FLI are lower than baseline for the same reasons given in the-Plains
section.
Impact on Com Belt Region
Past due loan levels are projected to increase from 1.0 to 1.7 (1.5 percent in
i
baseline) percent from 1994 to 2000 (Figure 4.9). Past due loan levels are 13
percent above baseline by the year 2000. Past dues increase, because the times*
interest-earned ratio falls 27 percent (23 percent in baseline) from 1994 to 2000.
The TIE ratio falls, because net cash farm income falls 13.4 percent (6 percent in
baseline) and interest expense increases 36 percent (33 percent in baseline) from
1994 to 2000.






Basdiac Scenario •— —
Figure 4.9. Comparing Continuing CRP to Baseline for the Com Belt Region
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Net cash farm income falls, despite a total of S15.1 billion ($18.2$ billion
for baseline) in farm program payments during this time period. From 1996 to
2000, total farm program costs are S3.13 billion (30 percent) less if CRP is
continued. If CRP is eliminated, direct government payments account for 40
percent of farmers' net cash farm income from 1998 to 2000.
Bankruptcies are forecasted to be 10 percent (2.0 versus 1.8) above baseline
by the year 2000. This is caused by the debt burden ratio increasing 16 percent
above baseline in 1999. As in the previous regions, debt is projected to vary less
than 3 percent between scenarios. Thus, the debt-to-asset ratio is 6 percent below
baseline in the year 2000, because farm asset values are 10 percent above baseline.
The Com Belt's financial leverage index is projected to be the lowest of all
regions by the year 2000. It is expected to decrease 11 percent (from 0.91 to
0.81) if CRP is continued and decline 7 percent (from 0.91 to 0.84) in the baseline
scenario.
Impact on South Region
The South region is projected to have the lowest levels of past dues and
bankruptcies in the U S. (Figure 4.10). This is expected since the South has the
strongest TIE and debt burden ratios in the nation. Delinquencies increase 33
percent from 1994 to 2000 for both scenarios. Bankruptcies increase 15 percent












Basdinc Scenario — — —
Figure 4.10. Comparing Continuing CRP to Baseline for the South Region
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Although the TIE ratio falls 12 percent (under both scenarios), its level (7.4) in
the year 2000 is still the highest of all regions. In fact, it is over twice the level
of 3.15 found in the Plains and Com Belt regions.
Annual farm program payments average $1 billion under both scenarios, but
account for only 6| percent of the region's net cash farm income. If CRP is
continued, farm asset values will be $20 billion (12 percent) above baseline by the
year 2000. Since the variation in debt between scenarios is less than 3 percent,
the debMo-asset ratio is 10 percent below baseline by the year 2000. FLI is
below baseline (1.08 versus 1.06) for the same reasons mentioned in previous
sections.
Discussion of a Ten Percent Reduction in Target Prices
In an attempt to reduce farm program costs, the 1990 Farm Bill froze target
prices at their 1990 level for all farm program crops. This freeze effectively
reduced farmers returns from farm program participation, because inflation
decreased the amount of deficiency payments in real terms. In 1995, Congress
again seeks to reduce its financial commitment to agriculture.
One of the budget cutting measures currently being considered by Congress
is reducing target prices in the 1995 Farm Bill. Thus^this section analyzes the
regional financial stress impacts from a 10 percent reduction in target prices (in
addition to eliminating the Conservation Reserve Program). Since farmers
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deficiency payments will be reduced if target prices are cut, it is expected that this
scenario will yield a higher level of financial stress than the baseline.
Discussion of Projections under Reduced Target Prices
Major Farm Sector Variables
Total Farm Assets. As in the baseline, U.S. farm asset values fall mainly
due to CRP land coming back on the market when the CRP is eliminated. U.S.
farm asset values fall 3.7 percent ($32.6 billion) from 1994-2000 if target prices
are reduced 10 percent. The decrease in value ranges from -0.67 percent (South)
to -8.0 percent (Com Belt) from 1994 to 2000. The West region records the only
growth in asset values of 1.46 percent. However, this is due to asset growth that
occurs before CRP is eliminated. The West's assets increase 5.42 percent (1994
to 1996), before falling 3.78 percent (1997 to 2000).
Total Farm Debt and Interest Expense. U.S. farm debt will increase 6.7
percent ($9.37 billion) from 1994 to 2000. As in the baseline, this is expected as
farmers borrow to bring CRP land back into production. Debt growth ranges from
2 percent (Com Belt) to 10.1 percent (South) over the six year period. The West,
Plains and Northeast debt levels increase 8.83, *7.33, and 3.93 percent,
respectively.
Farmers' interest expense increases 29.1 percent ($3.2 billion) from 1994 to
2000, due to the increases in farm debt and higher interest rates. Farmers in the
Plains will experience the largest growth in interest expense (38.3 percent) from
1994 to 2000. The other regions' interest expense increases between 22.7
(Northeast) and 28.7 percent (Com Belt).
Government Finn Program Costs. Deficiency payments are based on the
difference between target price and market price (and then multiplied by eligible
production). In the present scenario, when CRP land comes back into production
it drives down market price causing deficiency payments to increase. On the other
hand, reducing target prices decreases deficiency payments.
The net result of these opposing forces is farm program costs decrease 1.6
percent ($990 million) from 1.994 to 2000. Government payments to farmers
decrease the most in the West (3S.4 percent) and South (39 percent) regions.
Farmers in the Plains and Com Belt will see their program payments decrease 5.2
and 24.4 percent, respectively. Only farmers in the Northeast will see their
payments increase $133 million (20 3 percent) from 1994 to 2000.
Net Cash Farm Income. Of all the scenarios analyzed in this study, U.S.
farmers income is the lowest if target prices are cut. Farmers are hurt by reduced
farm payments, lower market prices for their crops and the higher production costs'
brought on by inflation. These factors cause U.S. net cash farm income to fall 6.9
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percent (S3.79 billion) from 1994 to 2000. Net income is projected to fall the
most in the Com Belt (30.2 percent). The Plains (-22.5 percent) and Northeast
(-15.S percent) also have a decrease in net income over time. The West (8.4
percent) and South (7.6
1994 to 2000.
Mearaies of Financial Performance
Debt-to-Aaset Ratio. The debt-to-asset ratio increases in every region from
1994 to 2000 if target prices are cut. This occurs because farm debt increases in
every region and asset values decrease in every region, except the West. The
West's debMo-asset ratio increases (from 0.16 to 0.17), because the 8.8 percent
increase in debt outweighs the 1.46 percent growth in assets from 1994 to 2000.
In the year 2000, the highest leverage ratios are in the Plains (0.2) and South
(0.19) regions. The Northeast region has the lowest projected beginning (0.12)
and ending (0.14) debt-to-asset ratio.' The Com Belt's leverage ratio increases
from 0.16 to 0.17 from 1994 to 2000.
Financial Leverage Index. Since debt is projected to increase in every
region, FLI will decrease in those regions where net cash farm income falls.
Thus, the financial leverage index in the Plains, Northeast and Com Belt regions
falls from 1994 to 2000. In all three of these regions. FLI is below one from
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1994 to 2000. The Com Belt has the lowest FLI of all regions from 1994 to 2000
(0.78 in 2000). Although the West's net cash farm income increases (8.4 percent),
its 23.7 percent increase in interest expense causes FLI to fall slightly from 1.01
to 1.0. The South's FLI begins and ends at 1.07, despite increasing (and then
decreasing) 6 percent from 1997 to 2000.
Times-Interest-Earned Ratio and Past Dues. The times-interest-eamed ratio
falls in every region from 1994 to 2000. The TIE ratios in the Plains, Northeast
and Com Belt fall, due to increased interest expense and decreased net cash farm
income. Although the South and West regions experience income growth, rapidly
increasing interest expense also causes these regions' TIE ratios to Tall. From
1994 to 2000, the South will have the highest TIE ratio (7.3 in the year 2000).
The lowest TIE ratios are projected (in the year 2000) in the Plains (2.99) and
Com Belt (2.8) regions.
The .projected fall in the TIE ratio for all regions results in past dues
increasing in every region. The largest percentage increases in past dues will
occur in the Plains (12? percent) and Com Belt (110 percent). These regions also
have the greatest projected decrease (33 percent) in their TIE ratios. Past dues in
the West and Northeast will increase from 1.7 percent of farm borrowers in 1994
to 2.1 (2.6 in Northeast) percent of borrowers in the year 2000. The South is
projected to have the lowest levels of past dues during this time period (1.2
SI
percent in the year 2000).
Debt Burden Ratio and Bankruptcies. The Plains, Northeast and Com Belt
regions will experience significant increases in their debt burden ratios. These
regions debt burdpn ratios increase 38.5,23^5 and 46.1 percent, respectively. Debt
j
burden ratios increase in these regions, due to higher debt levels and negative
growth in net cash farm income. The South region's debt burden ratio increases
from 1.77 to 1.81 from 1994 to 2000. The West region's debt burden ratio begins
and ends at approximately 2.5 and varies less than 2.5 percent from 1994 to 2000.
Since the debt burden ratio in the West is not robust over time, projected
bankruptcies for the West are unchanged (1.9 percent of farmers) from 1997 to
2000. Increased debt burden ratios in the Plains, Com Belt and South result in
bankruptcies increasing 33,44, and 15 percent, respectively. Bankruptcies in the
Northeast fall from 3.1 to 2.2 percent of farmers.
Comparing a Ten Percent Decrease in target Prices to Baseline
The difference between both scenarios' measures of financial stress Is
expected to be the largest in those regions with the largest production of farm
program crops (i.e. Com Belt and Plains regions). Figures in each of the
following sections provide a graphical comparison between a ten percent reduction
in the target prices and the baseline for the six measures of financial stress used
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in this study. Tables (A6 - A10 in the appendix) provide data on annual levels,
annua] percentage change and percent deviation from baseline for alt six measures
of financial stress.
Impact on West Region
Past dues rise 23 percent for both scenarios from 1994 to 2000 (Figure 4.11).
This decrease is fueled by a 12 percent decrease in the times-interest-eamed ratio.
The TIE ratio falls, due to interest expense growing 26 percent (28 percent in
baseline) while net cash farm income only increases 8.4 percent (10.96 percent in
baseline) from 1994 to 2000.
Bankruptcies decrease from 2.2 to 1.9 percent of farmers and are 1.5 percenl
above baseline in the year 2000. The debt burden ratio tends to'remain at
approximately 2.5 for both scenarios. This occurs because debt and income
growth rates are within 3 percent of each other under both scenarios. Farm asset
values are 0.3 percent below baseline in the year 2000. Asset values are lowei
because net cash farm income growth is 2.6 percent below baseline when target
prices are cut. Thus, the debt-to-asset rqtio is 1.8 percent below baseline in the
year 2000. The financial leverage index falls from 1.01 to 1.0 in both scenarios.
Impact on Plains Region
If target prices are-cut, the Plains region will experience the most rapid
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Figure 4.11 Componr^j Ten Percent Reduction in
the Target Price to Baseline for the West Region
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increase in past dues and have the highest level of delinquencies by theyear 2000.
Delinquencies increase 123 percent over the projected time period and are 20
percent above baseline by the year 2000 (Figure 4.12). Past dues increase,
because a 10 percent cut in target prices significantly effects fanners profitability.
Net cash farm income is expected to be 18.4 percent ($1.7 billion) below baseline
if target prices are cut 10 percent.
Bankruptcies increase 33 percent (from 1.5 to 2 percent of farmers) and are
9.4 percent above baseline in the year 2000. Bankruptcies increase because the
debt burden ratio increases 38 percent and is 20 percent above baseline in the final
year. The debt burden ratio is above baseline, because net cash farm income is
18.4 percent below baseline (in the year 2000) while debt levels are within 2
percent.
In the year 2000, farm program payments account for 29 percent (43 percent
under baseline) of farmers net cash farm income. The debt-to-asset ratio varies
less than one percent from baseline, because debt and asset values vary less than
two percent between scenarios. The FLI is3.8 percent below baseline (in the year
2000), due to net cash farm income being 18.4 percent less than baseline.
Impact on Northeast Kegion
Past dues increase 53 percent (from 1.7 to 2.6 percent of farmers) and are
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Figure 4.12. Comparing ja Ten Percent Reduction in
the Target Price to Bascliqe for the Plains egion
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percent (from 6.4 to 4.7) and is roughly 2 percent below baseline from 1997 to
2000. The TIE ratio falls due to negative income growth and higher interest
expenses in both scenarios. Bankruptcies fall 29 percent (3.1 to 2.2 percent of
farmers) and are S.S percent above baseline at the end of this century.
The debt burden ratio increases 24 percent and is roughly 3 percent above
baseline from 1998 to 2000. This ratio increases because net cash farm income
declines 15.8 (11.1 in baseline) percent while farm debt grows 3.9 (6.4 in
baseline) percent from 1994 to 2000. The debt*to*asset ratio is the lowest of all
regions from 1994 to 2000. Both scenarios leverage ratios increase from 0.12 to
0.14, due to increasedUebt levels and lower farm asset values. The FLI falls from
0.97 to 0.91 and is one percent below baseline in the year 2000.
Farm program costs will be a total of $1.88 billion below baseline from 1994
to 2000 if target prices are cut ten percent. However, this budget savings almost
perfectly matches the amount ($1.6 billion) that total net cash farm income will
be below baseline for this time period. Thus, government budget cuts will come
at the direct expense of farmers' bottom line
Impact on Com Belt Region
Delinquencies increase 110 percent (from 1.0 to 2.1 percent of farmers) by
the year 2000, at which time they are 40 percent above baseline (Figure 4.14).
Bankruptcies grow 44 percent and are 28 percent higher than the baseline at the
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Fif*irc4,l3 Comparing a Ten Percent Reduction in
the Target Price to Baseline for the Northeast Region
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turn of the century. The TIE ratio apd FU ratio are the lowest in the nation (both
scenarios). The TIE ratio decreases 36 percent (from 4.31 to 2.8) and is IS
percent below the baseline in the year 2000. The TIE ratio falls, because net cash
farm income declines 30 (6 in baseline) percent while interest expense increases
29»(33 in baseline) percent.
The FLI decreases 14 percent (0.91 to 0.78) and is 8 percent belqw the
baseline. The debt burden ratio iV the highest of all the U S. regions. It increased
46 percent (from 3.66 to S.35) and is 30 percent above baseline in the year 2000
Debt growth varies less than 3.S percent between scenarios, so a higher debt
burden ratio (when target prices are cut) is mainly the result of net cash farm
income being 25 percent below baseline.
Total farm program costs are $6.4 billion below baseline from 1994 to 2000
if target prices are cut. However, this budget savings again translates into an
equivalent decrease in net cash farm income ($6.17 billion) from 1994 to 2000.
From 1999 to 2000, farmers receive an average of 19 percent (41 percent for
baseline) of their net cash farm income from the government.
Impact on South Region
The South region is projected to have the least financial stress of all regions.
Past dues levels are forecasted to be thq lowest in the nation. Under both
scenarios, delinquencies are projected to increase from 0.9 to 1.2 percent of farm
89
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Figurc4.14 Comparing a Ten Percent Reduction in ‘
the Target Price to Baseline for the Com Belt Region
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borrowers (Figure 4.15). The TIE ratio should fall 13 percent (from 8.6 to 7.5)
by the year 2000 and never vary more than 1.1 percent from the baseline. The
/
times-interest-eamed ratio declines, because the growth in interest expense (28.7
percent) exceeds the increase in net cash farm income of 7.6 percent. The South's
TIE ratio will always be the highest in the U.S. and over twice the level in the
Plains (2.99) and Coi^ Belt (2.8) regions in the year 2000.
Bankruptcies will increase 15 perceht and be 2 percent above baseline in the
year 2000. The debt burden ratio increases slightly from 1.77 to 1.81 (1.83 in
baseline), but is always the lowest in the nation. The FLI begins and ends at 1.07
and is always within one percent of baseline. The consistency of the South's FLI
is the result of having growth rates in net cash farm income (7.6 percent) and debt
(10.1 percent) that only differ by 2.5 percent. The debt-to-asset ratio increases
from 0.174 to 0.193 and is two percent below the baseline. The leverage ratio
increases, due to the increase in debt and the fall in asset values.
Discussion of a Two Percent Reduction in the
Growth Rate of the Money Supply
This section discusses the regional impacts resulting from a two percent
slower growth rate in the money supply (in addition to the elimination of CRP).
Slower money growth reduces the availability of loanable funds and causes
interest rates to increase. Thus, slower money growth results in farmers incurring
•91
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Figure 4.15. Comparing a Ten Percent Reduction in
the Target Price ti? Baseline for the South Region
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higher interest expenses on existing loans and increased difficulty in borrowing
i
new funds.
The value of the Uriited States' dollar increases under this scenario. A
stronger dollar makes U.S. agricultural exports more expensive to importing
countries, so less is exported. U.S. crop producers are heavily dependent on
exports. Thus, they are hurt by a decrease in agricultural exports, because it
causes lower domestic crop prices. This causes higher farm program costs,
because of higher deficiency payments. U.S. livestock producers will benefit from
lower feed costs, but will be hurt by increased interest expense.
Discussion of Projections under Reduced Money Supply Growth
Major Farm Sector Variables
Total Farm Assets. The value of U.S. farm assets fall 3.4 percent (S30
billion) from 1994 to 2000 if the growth rate in the money supply is reduced by
i
two percent a year. This decrease is largely due to the return of CRP land to
production. In addition, higher interest rates decrease farmers' profit. This
decreases the demand for farm land which lowers land (and farm equipment)
values.
*
The value of farm assets in all but the West region are projected to decrease
from 1994 to 2000. The decrease ranges from 0.49 percent in the South to a 7.12
percent drop in the Com Belt. The Plains and Northeast regions lose 6.42 and
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4.72 percent of their asset values, respectively. The West region’s asset values
increase 5.3 percent from 1^94 to 1996. Hot.ever, when CRP land comes back
into production (starting in 1997), the West’s asset values fall 3.6 percent from
1996 to 2000. Overall, the West experiences a 1.68 percent growth in asset value
from 1994 to 2000.
Total Farm Debt md Interest Expense. Fanners' total debt increases 7.8
percent ($10.9 billion) from 1994 to 2000 if money growth is slowed. All regions
increase their debt levels. Debt growth ranges from 4.26 percent in ihe Com Belt
to 11.01 percent in the South. The other regions' (West, Plains, and Northeast)
debt increases 9.7,7.94, and 4.73 percent, respectively. Debt growth is expected,
due to the real estate transfers and capital expenditures that will occur when CRP
land comes back into production -
Interest expense's growth rate is higher than debt's growth rate, due to higher
interest rates. Interest expense is projected to increase over 50 percent in the
Plains (58.27 percent) and Com Belt (52.16 percent) from 1994 to 2000. The
remaining regions all have projected increases between 39 74 (Nortncaat) and
44.37 (South) percent.
Government Farm Program Costs. Farm program costs increase 30 percent
($1.9 billion) from 1994 to 2000. As in the baseline, government costs increase
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due to higher deficiency payments that result from lower market prices for farm
program crops. Farm program costs increase most in the Northeast (66.89
percent). Plains (41.07 percent) and Com Belt (23.05 percent) regions. The West
and South receive 10.61 and 8.65 percent increases, respectively.
Net Cash Farm Income. U.S. net cash farm income falls 4.6 percent ($2.51
billion) from 1994 to 2000. This decrease is mainly the result of a price squeeze.
U.S. farmers face a price squeeze resulting from target prices being frozen at 1990
levels, while the costs of production increase due to inflation. Only the West and
South are projected to experience growth in net cash farm income. Since these
regions also experience the smallest growth in government payments, it seems
these regions' fanners are the least reliant on farm program crops.
Net cash farm income increases 9.33.percent ($1.1 billion) in the West and
8.35 percent ($1.35 billion) in the South. The projected decreases for the Plains,
Northeast and Com Belt are 16.23, 14.92, and 25.84 percent, respectively. In the
year 2000, the Com Belt and Plains regions'., will receive 30 and 40 percent
(respectively) of their net cash farm income from government payments.
Measures of Financial Performance
Debt-to*Asset Ratio. All five regions' debt-to-asset ratios increase from 1994
to 2000 if growth in the money supply is slowed This increase results from
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increased debt levels in every region and lower regional asset values (except in the
West). The West’s debt-to-asset ratio "increases (froth 0.16 to 0.17), because the
11.01 percent increase in debt outweighs the 1.68 percent growth in assets (1994
to 2000). The debt-to-asset ratio changes the most in 1997 when CRP land comes
back into production.
The Northeast region has the lowest beginning (0.12) and ending (0.14) debt-
to-asset ratio. The highest ending leverage ratios occur in the Plains (0.20) and
South (0.19) regions. The Com Belt's leverage ratio starts at 0.16 and increases
to 0.18 in the year 2000.
Financial Leverage Index. The FLI is projected to decrease in every region
from 1994 to 2000. This decrease is obvious for those regions (Plains, Northeast
and Com Belt) whose debt levels increase while their net cash farm income falls.
The remaining regions' (West and South) FLIs decrease, because their respectiye
income growth rates (9.33 and 8.35 percent) are surpassed by their debt growth
rates (9.69 and 11.01 percent). Only the South is projected to have a FLI above
one (1.06) in the year 2000 The Com Belt is expected to have the lowest FLI
(0.75) in the year 2000.
Times-Interest-Eamed Ratio and Past Dues. The TIE ratio will decrease in
every region from 1994 to 2000. The Plains, Northeast and Com Belt regions’
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TIE ratio falls, due to a rapid growth in interest expense and negative growth in
net cash farm income. The West and South regions' TIE ratio falls, because their
interest expense grows over 40 percent, while net cash farm income only grows
about 9 percent from 1994 to 2000. The South will always have the highest TIE
ratio (6.72 in the year 2000). The lowest TIE ratios are projected (in the year
2000) in the Plains (2.88) aid Com Belt (2.61) regions.
Past dues are negativ^y related to the TIE ratio. Since the TIE ratio is
projected to decrease in evejy region^p^tlues will increase in all regions. The
South is projected to have the lowest levels of past dues (1.4 percent in the year
2000), as it has the highest TIE ratio from 1994 to 2000. The Plains region
experiences the largestpercentage increase (138 percent) in pist dues, since it also
has the largest percentage decrease (37 percent) in the TIE ratio. The Com Belt
and Northeast regions' past dues increase 120 and 76 percent, respectively.
Delinquencies in the West increase 41 percent (1.7 to 2.4) from 1994 to 2000.
Debt Burden Ratio and Bankruptcies. The Plains, Northeast and Com Belt
regions' debt burden ratios increase^ due to increased debt levels and negative
growth in net cash farm income. Overall, the West and South regions experience
little change in their debt burden ratios. This occurs because the growth rates for
debt and income are similar within each region. For example, income (in the
West) grows 9.33 percent while debt increases 9.69 percent from 1994 to 2000.
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Bankruptcies are positively^related to the lag of the debt burden ratio. Thus,
the Plains and Com Belt regions' bankruptcies increase (27 percent and 13 percent,
respectively), due to higher debt burden ratios. Bankruptcy rates fall 14 percent
in the Westfregion from 1994 to 2000. This region’s debt burden ratio varies less
than 4 percent during this time period. Bankruptcies in the South increase 15
percent from 1994 to 1996 and then remain unchanged.
Bankruptcies in the Northeast decrease 29 percent (from 3.1 to 2.2) even
though the debt burden ratio increases 23.5 percent from 1994 to 2000. The
» * »
reason for this surprising result is that bankruptcies fall the most (from 3.1 to 2.3
percent) from 1994 to 1995. This decrease occurs one year after the debt burden
ratio falls 34.4 percent. Bankruptcies are unchanged from 1996 to 1999 as the
debt burden ratio only varies 6.1 percent from 1995 to 1998.
Comparing a Reduction in Money Supply Growth to the Baseline
Figures in each of the following sections provide a graphical comparison
between a two percent slower growth rate in the money supply and the baseline
for, the six measures of financial stress used in this study. Tables (A11 - A15 in
the appendix) provide data on annual levels, annual percentage change and percent
deviation from baseline for all six measures of financial stress.
Impact on West Region
Past dues are projected to increase from ! .7 to 2.4 percent of farm borrowers
and be roughly 15 percent above baseline by the year 2000 (Figure 4.16). This
increase is driven by the fact past dues are a function of the times-interest-eamed
ratio. The times interest earned (TIE) ratio is approximately 10 percent below the
baseline, due to the higher farm interest expense that resulted from higher interest
rates.
Farm bankruptcies decrease from 2.2 to 1.9 percent of farmers and are 1.5
percent above baseline in the year 2000. The minor change in bankruptcies is the
result of a debt burden ratio that varies less than 2.5 percent in either scenario.
The debt burden ratio is stationary, because debt and income grow at almost
identical \(ates of 9.69 (11.21 in baseline) and 9.33 (10.96 in baseline) percent,
respectively.
The debt*to-asset ratio increases from 0.16 to 0.173 and is 1.3 percent below
baseline in 2000. Leverage increases because farm debt growth (9.7 percent)
outpaces asset growth (1.68 percent) from 1994 to 2000. The FLI falls from 1.01
to 0.98 and is 2 percent below baseline.
Impact on Plains Region
Delinquencies increase from 1.3 to 3.1 percent of farm borrowers and will













Figure 4.16. Comparing a Two Percent Slower Growth
Rate in the Money Sdpply to Baseline for the West Region
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(Figure 4.17) Interest expense increases faster than the baseline (5$ ^ersus 41
percent) when the growth in the money supply is reduced, due to higher interest
rates. Net cash farm income falls 16 (5 in baseline) percent from 1994 to 2000.
Thus, the times-interest-^amed ratio falls 36.7 percent and is 15.2 percent below
baseline in the year 2000.
Farm bankruptcies mimic the baseline's marginal increase from 1.5 to 1.9
percent of farmers. Bankruptcies increase due to a 29 percent increase in the debt
'burden ratio. This ratio increases, because debt grows 7.9 percent and net cash
farm income falls 16.2 percent from 1994 to 2000. The financial leverage index
is projected to fall from 0.94 to 0.82 and be 7.4 percent below baseline by the
year 2000. This means that, collectively, farmers in the Plains region would not
be earning a profit from their use of debt. The debt-to-asset ratio increases from
0.173 to 0.20 (both scenarios), because farm asset values fall 6.4 percent and farm
debt increases 7.9 percent.
Impact on Northeast Region
Past dues will increase a^out 75 percent (from 1.7 to 3 percent of fafjper
borrowers) by the year 2000.\They will be roughly 20 percent above the baseline;
for the last three years of this century (Figure 4.18). The TIE ratio decreaseso3
percent and is 11 percent below baseline in the year 2000. This fall results from
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Figure 4.17. Comparing a Two Percent Slower Growth
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Figure 4.18. Comparing a Two Pcrccni Slower Growth
Rate in the Money Supply to Baseline for the Northeast Region
103
from 1994 to 2000.
Bankruptcies decrease 26 percent (from 3.1 to 2.3 percent of farmers) from
1994 to 1995 (both scenarios), because the debt burden ratio falls 35 percent from
1993 to 1994. After 1995, bankruptcies remain basically unchanged. The debt
burden ratio increases from 1.83 to 2.3, due to the fall in net income and a 4.7
percent increase in debt. This region's low debt burden ratio is less than half the
ratio in the Plains (4.6) and Com Belt (5.1) regions in the year 2000.
The Northeast is projected to have the lowest debt-to*asset ratio of all
regions under either scenario. The leverage ratio increases from 0.12 to 0.14,
because debt levels grow 4.7 percent while asset values fall 4.7 percent from 1994
to 2000. ELI decreases from 0.97 to 0.89 for the same reasons stated in previous
regions.
Impact on Com Belt Region
The Com Belt region is expected see delinquencies increase from I to 2.2
percent of farm borrowers and be 47 percent above baseline in the year 2000
(Figure 4.19). Past due farm loans start to increase significantly above the
baseline in 1998 The TIE ratio falls (for the same reasons it falls in the Plains)
from 4 3 to 2 6 and is 22 percent below baseline in the year 2000.
Farm bar kruptcies are expected to increase slightly from 1.6 to 1.8 percent














Figure 4.19. Comparing a Two Percent Slower Qrowth /
Rate in the Money Supply to Baseline for the Corn Belt Ri$ion
3.7 to 5.15 (for the same reasons given in the Plains' section) and is 25 percent
above baseline in the year 2000. The financial leverage index decreases from 0.91
in 1994 to 0.75 in 2000, at which time it is 12 percent below baseline. The Com
Belt has the lowest FL1 in the nation. The debt-to-asset ratio increases from (iH6
to 0.175 (both scenarios) as debt increases (4.3 percent) and asset values fall 7.1
percent from 1994 to 2000.
The Com Belt's net cash farm income is highly dependent on farm program
payments. From 1994 to 1998, net cash farm income grew by 5 percent.
However, government payments for this region increased 150 percent during this
time period.'Over the projected time period, farm program payments totalled S18
billion and comprised (on average) 34 percent of net cash farm income.
Impact on South Region
Beginning in 1997, delinquencies will average about 20 percent above the
baseline (Figure 4.20). The TIE ratio falls 22 percent (to 6.7) over the projected
time period. However, it remains the highest of any region and over twice the
level present in the Plains (2.9) and Com Belt (2.6) regions. The TIE ratio is 10
percent below the baseline from 1997 to 2000, because higher interest rates cause
interest expense growth (44 percent) to be 15 percent above baseline. Net cash
farm income growth is similar (8 percent) in both scenarios
Bankruptcies are expected to increase from 1.3 to 1.5 percent of farmers
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Figure 4.20. Comparing a Two Percent Slower Growth
Rate in the Mpney Supply to Baseline for the South Region
(both scenarios) from 1994 to 2000. The debt burden ratio increases slightly from
1.77 to 1.81 (both scenarios), due to an^ 1 percent increase in debt which barely
outpaces an 8.4 percent increase in farm income. The South is projected to have
the only financial leverage index above one (1.06 in the year 2000). This means
fanners will profit from using leverage. The debt-to-asset ratio increases (both
scenarios) from 0.175 to 0.195 (for the same reasons given in the Com Belt
section).
Summxry
This chapter compared the financial stress affects from three separate
government policy alternatives to a baseline scenario that assumed the CRP was
eliminated. The AG-GEM model's projections of five major farm sector variables
were dj?cu$sed for each policy scenario. A detailed explanation of how these
variables affected the six measures of regional financial stress used in this study
was then provided for each scenario. Separate regional comparisons of the
financial stress measures were done between each of the three policy scenarios and
the baseline
In general, the South region experiences the least financial stress of any
region for all jpolicy scenarios The Com Belt and Plains regions suffer the
highest level of financial stress in the U.S., especially when target prices are cut
10 percent or the growth in the money supply is reduced 2 percent a year.
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Overall, a reduction in money supply is the most financially stressful of all policy
alternatives analyzed in this study.
A surprising result is that farmers actually experience more financial stress
if CRP is continued, than if it is eliminated. This mainly occurs because fanners
receive higher deficiency payments if CRP is eliminated. The elimination of CRP
drives down market prices, because it brings farm land back into production which
increases the supply of farm program crops. If CRP is continued, total farm
program costs from 1996 to 2000 are 19 percent below baseline. The lowest
government costs (from 1996 to 2000) are achieved by cutting the target price io




The severe financial stress U.S. fanners experienced in the 1980s had many
causes and affects. A rapid increase in real net farm income and U.S. agricultural
exports in the early *\ 970s encouraged farmers to rapidly expand their operations
in the belief this would maximize future profits. This expansion was funded by
a huge increase in borrowing from agricultural lending institutions who were eager
to increase their own market share of agricultural loans. Lenders usual concern
over loan defaults was minimized by the rising values in the assets they held as
collateral.
In the 1980s, farmers were hard pressed to meet their high debt repayment
obligations due to low levels of net farm income. Furthermore, the value of
collateral for farm mortgage loans plummeted. Fanners' financial deterioration in
the 1980s is evident by the high loan loss levels on agricultural loans and the
number of agricultural bank failures. The U.S. government sought to reduce
farmers fiofencial stress by dramatically increasing farm program payments in the
late !9d0s.
Farmers and agricultural lenders memory of the last two decades has resulted
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in a more conservative approach to borrowing and lending practices in the 1990s
However, even with agriculture's reduced debt level, farmers still face the
possibility* of renewed financial stress. This possibility exists due to the
significant amount ofnet income that farmers derive from farm program payments,
These payments will likely be reduced as Congress is currently debating whethei
to eliminate or cut several farm programs in order to help balance the federal
budget.
In particular, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is receiving
considerable attention. CRP was established by Congress in the 1985 Farm Acl
as a voluntary long-term cropland retirement program. About eight percent oi
U.S. cropland (36'4 million acres) is currently enrolled in CRP at an annual cost
of $1.8 billion. Contracts covering more than 24 million acres will expire in
1996 and 1997.
CRP acres are concentrated in the Plains and western Com Belt regions.
Thus, policy alternatives dealing with the elimination or continuation of CRP will
have different' regional financial stress affects on farmers. Another policy
alternative being considered is to reduce the target price ten percent on all farm
program crops. This alternative is expeded to lower government cost by
decreasing deficiency payments to farmers.
Th£ main objective of this study' was the application of estimated equations
and other indicators of financial stress to policy analysis. The percent of farm
Ill
loan volume delinquent 30 days or more at a financial institution and percent of
fanners in the institution's lending area who have filed for bankruptcv Were two
of the financial stress indicators analyzed in this study. Others included the times-
interest-earned ratio, the debt burden ratio, the financial leverage index, and the
debt-to-asset ratio.
All of the above measures of financial stress were projected for a baseline
scenario and three other policy alternatives. The baseline was then separately
compared to each of the three policy scenarios. An analysis .was then done on
the trends in a broad set of short-run and long-run measures of financial stress to
determine the relative impacts different policies had on the regional financial stress
of fanners.
Chapter n discusses previous studies , and theories regarding a set of
aggregate economic and financial indicators used in measuring aggregate financial'
stress in agriculture.. Previous studies relevant to this research are summarized in
the first three sections of Chapter II: (1) analyzing aggregate financial stress and
risk, (2) the relationship between macroeconomy and financial sector and (3)
financial ratios as predictors of financial stress. The remaining sections discuss
three categories of financial measures often used in analyzing the level of financial
stress. These categories are profitability, leverage, and the ability to service debt.
Different measures within each category are defined. Also, their purpose and
limitations are explained.
Chapter III reports the coefficient estimates developed in this study and
discusses the results of various methods used to validate the regional financial
stress model. The first section of Chapter HI outlines this study's model, explains
the assumptions for its selection and reports the results from the test of these
assumptions. The second section details validation .methods, the model's
coefficient estimates, their statistical significance, R3 and the negative test results
for autocorrelation.
Regional past due equations were found to explain between 64 and 84
percent of the variation in regional past dues. Regional bankruptcy equations
explained between 48 and 86 percent of the variation in regional bankruptcies.
Coefficients in both models were all found to be of proper sign and statistically
significant The third section of Chapter m developed a test for structural change
and reported that this test for change was negative. Finally, the fourth section
reported the results of forecasting the model using within sample data.
Chapter IV analyzed the regional results from four policy scenarios on six
measures of financial stress. The AG-GEM model's projections of five major farm
sector variables were discussed for each policy alternative. A detailed discussion
of how these variables effected the six measures of regional financial stress used
in this study was then provided for each scenario.
Model results were analyzed by comparing regional financial stress measures
from each of three policy scenarios to a baseline scenario. For this study, the
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baseline scenario assumed that the CRP is eliminated. The other three scenarios
, being compared to the baseline are: a continuation of CRP, eliminate CRP plus
reduce target prices ten percent, and a two percent reduction in the growth rate of
the money supply in addition to eliminating CRP.
Condastans
A two percent reduction in the growth rate of the money supply was the
most financially stressful of the four policy alternatives analyzed in this study.
The Com Belt and Plains regions experienced the highest level of financial stress
in the U.S. for all scenarios. Farm financial stress in these regions was most acute
if, in addition to eliminating CRP, target prices were reduced or the growth in the
money supply was ^owed. This is interesting from a policy perspective, since
these two regions Contain nearly sixty * percent of the acres currently in the
Conservation ReserveTrogram. In general, the South region experienced the least
financial stress of any region for all policy scenarios.
A surprising result is that farmers actually experience more financial stress
if CRP is continued, than if it is eliminated. In fact, the elimination of the CRP
was the least financially stressful of all policy alternatives considered in this study.
This mainly occurs because farmers receive higher deficiency payments if CRP
is eliminated. The elimination of CRP drives down market prices, because it
brings farm land back into production which increases the supply of farm program
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. crops.
Ftrm program payments were highest if CRP is eliminated. Under this
r
policy alternative, budget outlays to fanners would increase $4 billion from 1994
to 2000. If CRP is continued, total farm program costs from 1996 to 2000 would
be 19 percent below baseline. The lowest government costs (from 1996 to 2000)
were achieved by cutting the target price 10 percent This results in farm program
costs that are 39 pq^cent below baseline.
The debt-to-asset ratio was the most widely used measure of financial stress
prior to the mid-1980s. However, this study's results support previous research
findings that other measures possess better predictive ability of financial stress
than the debt-to-asset ratio. This study found the times-interest-earned ratio was
the best predictor of farm loan delinquency. In modeling farm bankruptcy, the
debt burden ratio was the best independent variable.
Both of these independent variables appear logical within their respective
models. In the short-run, farm operations must general* sufficient cash flow to
meet current interest expense or their loans will become delinquent. Since the
times-interest-eamed ratio measures the relationship between cash flow and
interest expense, it is a logical choice as a predictive variable. Similarly, in the
long-run, farm income must be sufficient to cover principal payments or
bankruptcy will result. The debt burden ratio measures the relationship between
farm debt and income. Thus, the debt burden ratio's predictive ability within a
bankruptcy mode! has intuitive appeal-
♦
Limitations
The most severe limitation faced in this study was the lack of historical data
on measures of farmers financial stress. It appears the severe financial stress
farmers experienced in the 1980s provided the impetus for agencies, such as the
USDA-ERS, to start collecting information on several different financial stress
measures. The limited years of data available on past diie farm loans and farm
bankruptcies at the regional level restricted the number of explanatory variables
used in this study's model.
A limitation of this study's model results is that no distinction was made by
type of farm in each region. It is expected that financial stress levels differ
between various commodity producers within any given region. Another potential
/
limitation is that this study's projections implicitly assume that future bank lending
policies will be similar to those present during the 1980s. Also, this study's
projections are affected by the standard errors from the AG-GEM model's
forecasts of the independent variables used in this study.
Suggestions for Future Research
Within the existing framework of this study's model, different policy
alternatives could be examined to determine their impact on farmers financial
116
stress. As more data becomes available over time, it will be possible to re*
estimate this study's equations. Additional data will strengthen model validation
efforts by allowing for out-of-sample forecasts. In addition, tests for structural
change at the regional level can then be performed.
Future research might also focus on the financial stress levels of particular
commodity producers within a particular region or state. In addition, other applied
research could consider using financial stress measures to forecast the expected
risk agri-businesses face by extending credit to farmers.
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Table A1. West Region: Stress Measures for Baseline and Continue CRP
Projected Measures of Regional Financial
POLICY Stress in Agriculture
SCENARIO: Continue CRP
Year
WEST REGION 1IM IttS llfi UfZ litt lift 2000
Farm loan volume at Ag. banks
delnquent 30 days or more (percent):
Level In Baselne 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1
% change from a year ago 21.5 1.4 -1.3 3.7 2.3 6.0 72
Level in Poicy Scenario 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1
% change from a year ago 21.5 1.4 -1.3 6.4 5.0 62 6.4
% deviation from Baseline -0.0 -0.0 -0.1 2.6 5.4 5.5 4.8
Farmers in Ag. banks' lending area
who filed for bankruptcy (percent):
Level in Baseline 22 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
S change from a year ago -22.0 •6.7 -3.1 -3.1 -1.1 •0.7 0.6
Level in PoHcy Scenario 22 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0
% change from a year ago •22.0 -6.7 -3.1 -3.1 0.5 1.3 1.4
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0 1.5 3.5 4.3
Times Interest Earned Ratio
Level in Baselne 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.6 . 6.5 62 5.6
% change from a year ago -6.5 1.4 1.3 .-3.3 -1.5 -4.7 -52
Level in PoHcy Scenario 6.60 6.69 6.79 6.41 620 5.92 5.65
% change from a year ago -6.5 1.4 1.4 -5.5 -3.4 •4.5 -4.6
% deviation from Baseline
✓
w-
0.0 0.0 0.1 -22 -4.1 •3.9 -3.3
Debt Burden Ratio
Level in Baseline 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5
% change from a year ago 7.8 0.0 -3.1 0.6 -0.5 1.8 1.5
Level in Policy Scenario 2.50 2.50 2.42 2.51 2.55 2.59 2.61
% change from a year ago 7.8 0.0 -32 3.4 1.9 1.5 0.7
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 -0.1 2.7 52 4.9 42
Financial Leverage Index
Level in Baselne 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
% change from a year ago -12 0.3 02 02 0.3 -0.6 -1.0
Level in Policy Scenario 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.98
% change from a year ago -12 0.3 • 02 -0.9 -0.4 -1.0 -1.1
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -1.8 -22 -2.4
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
Level in Baseline 02 02 02 02 02 02 02
% change from a year ago 1.8 0.4 -0.1 4.1 2.8 1.6 0.3
Level in Policy Scenario 0.18 0.16 die 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
% change from a year ago 1.8 0.4 T1 0.5 1.3 -0.6 -0.8% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 1.0 -3.5 -4.9 •6.9 -7.9
Table A2. Plains Region: Stress Measures for Baseline and Continue CRP
Projected Measures of Regional Financial
POLICY Stress in Agriculture
SCENARIO: Continue CRP
Year
PLANS REGION 1M4 1998 1991 1997 1998 1999 2000
Farm loan volume at Ag. banks
deBnquent 30 days or more (percent):
Level in Baseline 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.4
% change from a year ago 28.9 -10.6 17.0 11.0 5.6 9.8 12.7
Level in PoVcy Scenario 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.7
% change from a year ago 28.9 10.6 16.7 11.8 10.5 15.4 14.3
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.5 52 10.6 122
Farmers in Ag. banks’ lending area
who Ned for bankruptcy (percent):
Level In Baselne 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9
% change from a year ago -8.8 13.5 2.3 62 1.9 -0.5 2.3
Level in PoBcy Scenario 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0
S change from a year ago •8.8 13.5 2.3 6.0 2.4 2.4 5.4
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.0 -02 0.3 3.3 6.4
Times Interest Earned
Level in BaseHne 4.6 4.7 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.4
% change from a year ago -32.0 3.0 -11.8 -3.0 -0.3 -7.5 -62
Level in Poficy Scenario 4.55 4.69 4.15 3.98 3.78 3.39 3.15
% change from a year ago -32.0 "3.0 -11.5 -4.0 -5.1 -10.4 -7.1
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.7 -5.5 -8.4 -7.4
Debt Burden Ratio
Level in Baseline 3.6 3.3 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.1
% change from a year ago 49.4 -6.3 13.5 -12 •2.9 62 6.1
Level in Policy Scenario 3.56 3.34 .3.77 3.78 3.92 4.36 4.57"
% change from a year ago 49.4 -6.3 13.1 0.2 3.7 11.4 4.7
% deviation from Basefine 0.0 0.0 -0.4 1.0 7.9 13.1 11.6
Financial Leverage Index
Level in Baseline 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
% change from a year ago -6.3 12 -3.1 0.0 0.5 -2.3 -3.1
Level in Policy Scenario 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.86 0.64
% change from a year ago -6.3 12 -3.0 -12 -1.5 -42 -3.3
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.1 -3.1 -5.0 -5.1
Debt-to-Asaet Ratio
Level in Baseline 02 02 02 02 02 02 02
% change from a year ago 11.5 1.6 2.6 4.6 2.7 1.9 0.7
Level in Policy Scenario 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
% change from a year ago 11.5 1.6 2.6 0.8 , 15 -0.1 -0.4
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3.7 -4:8 •6.7 -7.7
Table A3. Northeast Region: Stress Measures for Baseline and Continue CRP
Projected Measures of Regional Financial
POLICY Stress in Agriculture
SCENARIO: Continue CRP
Year
NORTHEAST REGION 1194 1995 1999 199Z 1999 1999 2090
Farm loan volume at Ag. banks
delinquent 30 days or more (percent):
Level in BaseHne 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 22 2.5
% change from a year ago -6.8 3.0 8.8 5.1 4.4 7.9. 10.9
Level in PoHcy Scenario 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5
% change from a year ago -6.8 3.0 8.7 5.5 4.1 10.9 11.3
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 -0.1 02 -0.0 2.8 3.1
Farmers in Ag. banks' lending area
who filed for bankruptcy (percent): -
Level in BaseHne 3.1 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
% change from a year ago 23.5 -26.7 •6.4 0.7 -1.0 -0.3 2.4
Level in PoHcy Scenario 3.1 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 22
% change from a year ago 23.5 -26.7 -8.4 0.6 -0.6 •0.6 5.6
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.0 '-0.1 •0.3 0.0 32
Times Interest Earned
Level in Baseline 6.4 6.1 5.7 5.6 5.5 52 4.9
% change from a year ago 5.4 -4.9 •6.5 -1.8 •22 -5.4 •6.8
Level in Policy Scenario 6.4 6.1 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.1 4.8
% change from a year ago 5.4 •4.9 -6.4 -2.1 -1.9 -7.8 •62
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.3 • 0.1 -2.5 -1.9
Debt Burden Ratio
•
Level in Baseline '1.8 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 22
% change from a year ago -34.3 7.9 5.5 -1.4 0.2 2.6 3.7
Level in PoHcy Scenario 1.83 1.98 2.09 2.07 2.06 2.18 225
% change from a year ago -34.3 7.9 5.4 -1.0 -02 5.9 3.1
% deviation from Baseline o.d 0.0 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 3.1 2.5
Financial Leverage Index
Level in Baseline 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
% change from a year ago -3.6 -0.7 -12 0.1 •0.1 -1.1 -1.8
Level in PoHcy Scenario 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.91
% change from a year ago -3.6 -0.7 -1.1 •0.6 •0.4 -1.9 -1.8
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.9 -1.8 -1.8
Debt-to-Asset Ratid
Level in Baseline 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
% change from a year ago -24.1 2.1 1.5 3.5 2.6 1.3 -02
Level in Policy Scenario 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
% change from a year ago -24.1 2.1
•
1.5 -0.7 0.4 -0.3 -1.0
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.0 -4.0 *6.1 -7.5 -8.3
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Table A4. Com Belt Region: Stress Measures for Baseline and Continue CRP
Projected Measures of Regional Financial
POLICY Stress In Agriculture
SCENARIO: Continue CRP
Year
CORN BELT REGION lfM
Farm loan volume at Ag. banks
delinquent 30 days or more (percent):
Level in Baseline 1.0
% change from a year ago 1.0
Level in Policy Scenario 1.0
% change from a year ago 1.0
% deviation from Baseline 0 0
Farmers in Ag. banks' lending area
who filed for bankruptcy (percent):
Level in Baseline 1.6
% change from a year ago -5.9
Level in Pofcy Scenario 1.6
% change from a year ago -5.9
% deviation from Baseline 0.0
Times Interest Earned
Level in Baseline 4.3
% change from a year ago -14.3
Level in Policy Scenario 4.31
% change from a year ago *14.3
% deviation from Baseline 0.0
DebtBurden Ratio
Level in Baseline 3.7
% change from a year ago 112
Level in Policy Scenario 3.66
% change from a year ago 112
% deviation from Baseltrie 0.0
Financial Leverage Index
Level in Baseline 0.9
% change from a year ago -4.4
Level in Policy Scenario 0.91
% change from a year ago -4.4
% deviation from Baseline 0.0
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
Level in Baseline 02
% change from a^fear ago -1.4
Level in Policy Scenario 0.16
% change from a year ago -1.4
% deviation from Baseline 0.0
im 19H im 1IM 2000
1.0 1.1 12 12 1.3 1.5
*4.4 10.6 9.5 12 9.4 16.9
1.0 1.1 1.2 12 1.4 1.7
•4.4 10.4 9.9 1.0 20.5 20.8
0.0 -02 02 -0.1 10.1 13.7
1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8
2.9 -2.4 8.0 5.1 -32 2.4
1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.0
2.9 •2.4 7.8 5.5 -3.4 12.3
0.0 0.0 -02 02 -0.1 9.6
'4.6 4.0 3.9 4.1 3.7' 3.3
5.7 -13.0 -2.7 5.1 -8.4 -10.0
4.56 3.97 3.84 4.06 3.35 3.11
5.7 •12.9 -32 5.6 -17.6 -7.1
0.0 02 -0.3 02 -9.8 •6.9
3.4 4.0 4.0 3.6 ' 3.8 4.1
■6.5 15.7 0.1 -9.6 7.3 6.7
3.42 3.95 3.99 3.58 4.45 4.56
■6.5 15.4 0.9 -102 24.3 2.5
0.0 -0.3 0.4 -0.3 15.6 11.0
0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8
1.6 -3.7 -02 1.9 . -2.6 -4.0
0.93 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.84 0.81
1.6 -3.6. -12 1.6 •6.6 -3.5
0.0 0.1 -0.9 -12 -52 -4.7
02 02 02 0.2 02 02
0.0 2.8 3.8 0.8 2.1 0.4
0.16- 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
0.0 2.8 -0.4 -1.4 22 -1.1
0.0 0.0 •4.0 •6.1 -6.0 -7.4
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Table A5. South Region: Stress Measures for Baseline and Continue CRP
Projected Measures of Regional Financial
POLICY Stress in Agriculture
SCENARIO: Continue CRP
Year
SOUTH REGION ins ItM 1117 ltff 1981 2000
Farm loan volume at Ag. banks
delinquent 30 days or more (percent):
Level In Baseline 0.0 1.0 ■ 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 12
% change from a year ago 30.3 0.0 -1.7 2.7 3.7 4.7 8.9
Level in Policy Scenario 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 12
% change from a year ago 30.3 0.0 -1.8 52 5.1 3.9 6.5
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 -0.1 2.3 3.7 2.9 0.6
Farmers in Ag. banks' lending area
who filed for bankruptcy (percent):
Level in Baseline 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
% change from a year ago •10.1 5.0 10.8 -2.1 *1.5 02 -0.5
Level in Policy Scenario 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1(5 1.5 1.5
% change from a year ago •10.1 5.0 10.8 -22 1.0 2.1 -1.0
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 2.5 4.4 3.9
Times Interest Earned
Level in Baseline 8.6 8.3 8.5 8.3 8.1 7.9 7.4
% change from a year ago -0.5 -3.6 2.1 -2.1 . -2.3 -2.9 -5.6
Level in Po8cy§cenario
% change from a year ago
% deration from Baseline
8.62 8.31 8.40 8.17 7.02 7.75 7.43
-0.5 -3.6 22 -3.7 •3.1 -22 -4.1
0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.6 -2.4 -1.7 -0.1
Debt Burden Ratio
% Level in Baseline 1.8 1.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
% change from a year ago 0.6 6.7 -3.0 -0.8 0.5 -0.4 1.4
Level in Policy Scenario 1.77 1.80 1.81 1.84 1.86 1.84 1.83
% change from a year ago 0.6 6.7 -3.0 1.3 1.3 -12 -0.3
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 -0.0 1.0 2.8 2.0 02
.Financial Leverage Index
Level in Baseline 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
% change from a year’ago 1.1 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.4 -0.1 -0.8
'
Level in Policy Scenario 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.06
% change from a year ago 1.1 0.1 0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -0.5 -0.8
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1 •1.7 -2.1 -2.1
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
Level in Baseline 0.2 02 0.2 02 02 02 02
% change from a year ago 6.0 2.0 0.8 4.3 32 1.4 0.1
Level in Policy Scenario 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
S change from a year ago 6.0 2.0 0.8 0.2 1.1 -0.8 -0.9
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.0 -39 -5.8 -7.9 -8.7
127
Table A6. West Region: Stress Measures for 8aseiine and 10% Cut in TP
Projected Measures of Regional Financial
POLICY Stress in Agriculture
SCENARIO: Cut Target Price 10 Percent
Year
WEST REGION 1194 1995 1994 199Z 1999 1999 2Q0Q
Farm loan volume at Ag. banks
delinquent 30 days or more (percent):
Level in Baseline 17 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1
% change from a year ago < 21.5 1.4 -1.3 3.7 2.3 6.0 77
Level in Policy Scenario . 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.1
% change from a year ago 21.5 1.4 -0.5 5.0 1.8 6.1 5.9
% deviation from Baseline *0.0 -0.0 0.6 2.1 1.6 1.7 0.4
Farmers In Ag. banks' lending area
who filed for bankruptcy (percent):
Level In Baseline 27 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
% change from a year ago •22.0 •6.7 -3.1 -3.1 -1.1 -0.7 0.6
Level in Policy Scenario 22 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
% change from a year ago -22.0 ■8.7 -3.1 -2.7 -07 -0.7 0.8
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.3 1.3 1.5
Times Interest Earned Ratio
Level in Baseline 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.6 6.5 67 5.8
% change from a year ago -6.5 1.4 1.3 -3.3 -1.5 -4.7 -57
Level in Policy Scenario 6.60 6.69 6.74 6.45 6.39 6.08 5.83
% change from a year ago -6.5 1.4 0.6 -4.3 •0.9 4.8 4.1
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -1.7 -1.1 -1.3 -07
Debt Burden Ratio
Level in Baseline 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5
% change from a year ago 7.8 0.0 -3.1 0.6 -0.5 1.8 1.5
Level in Policy Scenario 2.50 2.50 2.44 2.49 2.46 2.51 2.51
% change from a year ago 7.8 0.0 -2.4 1.9 -1.1 1.9 0.1
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.8 2.0 i.4 1.5 07
Financial Leverage Index
Level in Baseline 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
% change from a year ago -12 0.3 07 07 0.3 •0.6 -1.0
Level in Policy Scenario 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 ~ 100
% change from a year ago -17 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 •0.8 -0.8 :*
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 o.o -07 -0.3 -0.3 -0.6 -0.4
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
Level in Baseline 07 07 07 07 07 07 07
% change from a year ago 1.8 0.4 -0.1 4.1 2.8 1.6 0.3
Level in Policy Scenario 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
% change from a year ago 1.8 0.4 -0.6
*
4.5 2.3 0.5 0.1
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -07 -0.6 -1.7 -1.8
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Table A7. Plains Region: Stress Measures for Baseline and 10S Cut in TP
Projected Measures of Regional Financial
POLICY Stress In Agriculture
SCENARIO: Cut Target Price 10 Percent
Year
PLANS REGION l»t4 1lt8 lfH 1M7 ltti lift 2000
Farm loan volume at Ag. banks
delinquent 30 days or more (percent):
Level in Basefine 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.4
% change from a year ago 28.9 10.0 17.0 11.0 5.6 9.6 12.7
Level In Poicy Scenario 1.3 1.4 1.7 2.0 22 2.5 2.9
S change from a year ago 20.9 10.0 21.6 17.0 7.9 14.3 16.3
S deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 42 9.8 122 10.7 20.4
Farmers In Ag. banks' lending area
who filed for bankruptcy (percent):
Level in Baseline 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.0 1.8 1.9
% change from a year ago -8.0 13.5 2.3 62 1.9 -0.5 2.3
Level ip Poicy Scenario 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.9 2.0
% change from a year ago -08 13.5 2.3 9.0 5.1 0.4 4.8
% deviation from Baseline 0.0
*
0.0 0.0 2.6 5.9 6.8 9.4
Times Interest Earned
Level in Baseline 4.6 4.7 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.4
% change from a year ago -32.0 3.0 -11.0 -3.0 -0.3 -7.5 -82
Level In Policy Scenario 4.55 4.69 3.95 3.68 3.69 3.30 2.99
S change from a year ago -32.0 ♦ 3.0 -15.9 -0.0 02 -10.6 •9.4
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 -4.7 -82 -7.7 -10.8 -12.0
Debt Burden Ratio
Level in Baseline 3.0 3.3 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.1
S change from a year ago 49.4 •0.3 13.5 -12 -2.9 02 8.1
Level In Policy Scenario 3.56 3.34 4.04 420 4.05 4.53 4.93
S change from a year ago 49.4 -0.3 21.0 4.1 -3.7 11.9 6.9
S deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 6.6 12.3 11.4 17.3 20.5
Financial Leverage Index
Level in Baseline 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
S change from a year ago -6.3 12 -3.1 0.0 0.5 -2.3 -3.1
Level in Poicy Scenario 0.94 0.95 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.83
% change from a year ago -0.3 12 -4.6 -1.3 0.7 -4.1 •4.3
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 -1.0 •2.9 -2.7 -4.6 -5.8
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
Level in Baseline 02 02 02 02 02 02 02
% change from a year ago 11.5 1.6 2.6 4.6 2.7 1.9 0.7
Level In Poicy Scenario 0.17 0.10 0.16 0.19 0.19 020 020
% change from a year ago 11.5 1.0 2.6 52 2.4 12 0.6
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 •0.0 0.5 02 -0.5 -0.4
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Table A8. Northeast Region: Stress Measures for Baseline and 10% Cut in TP
Projected Measures of Regional Financial
POLICY Stress in Agriculture
SCENARIO: Cut Target Price 10 Percent
Year
NORTHEAST REGION 1H4 1tfS lftft lftZ 1IM im 2000
Farm loan volume at Ag. banks
deHnquent 30 days or more (percent):
Level in BaseHne 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 22 2.5
% change from a year ago •6.8 3.0 8.8 5.1 4.4 7.9 10.9
Level in Polcy Scenario 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.6
% change from a year ago 4.8 3.0 10.1 8.7 42 9.4 11.0
% deviation from Basefine 0.0 0.0 12 2.7 2.6 4.1 42
Farmers in Ag. banks' lending area
who Wed for bankruptcy (percent):
Level in BaseHne 3.1 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
% change from a year ago 23.5 -26.7 -8.4 0.7 -1.0 -0.3 2.4
Level in Policy Scenario 3.1 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 22
(% chpntffe frame year ago 23.5 -26.7 -8.4 2.0 1.0 -0.0 4.4\^deviation from Basefine 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 3.3 3.6 5.5
Times Interest Earned
UyM in BaseHne 6.4 6.1 5.7 5.6 5.5 52 4.9
% change from a year ago 5.4 -4.9 •8.5 -1.8 -22 -5.4 -6.8
Level in PoHcy Scenario 6.4 8.1 5.7 5.5 5.4 5.1 4.7
% change from a year ago 5.4 •4.9 -7.5 -2.8 -1.6 ■6.7 •6.4
% deviation from BaseHne 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -2.1 -1.5 -2.8 •2.4
Debt Burden Ratio
Level in BaseHne 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 22
% change from a year ago -34.3 7.9 5.5 -1.4 02 2.6 3.7
Level in Policy Scenario 1.83 1.98 2.11 2.11 2.10 2.19 226
% change from a year ago -34.3 7.9 6.6 -0.1 -0.5 4.4 32
% deviation from Baseline 0.0
*
0.0 1.3 2.6 1.8 3.6 3.1
Financial Leverage Index
Level in BaseHne 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
% change from a year ago -3.6 -0.7 -12 0.1 -0.1 •1.1 -1.8
Level in Policy Scenario 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.91
% change from a year ago -3.6 •0.7 -1.5 -0.1 •0.0 -1.6 -1.7
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -1.0 •0.9
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
/
Level in BaseHne 0.1 .0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
% change from a year ago -24.1 2.1 1.5 3.5 2.8 1.3 -02
Level in Policy Scenario 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14
% change from a year ago -24.1 2.1 0.9 3.5 2.3 0.3 -0.0
% deviation from BaseHne 00 0.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.8 -1.7 -1.5
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Table A9. Com Belt Region: Stress Measures for Baseline and 10% Cut in TP
Projected Measures of Regional Financial
POLICY Stress in Agriculture
SCENARIO: Cut Target Price 10 Percent
Year
CORN BELT REGION im IfftS lftftft lftfZ lift! lftftft 2QQQ
Farm loan volume at Ag. banks
delinquent 30 days or more (percent):
Level in BaseRne 1.0 1.0 1.1 12 12 1.3 1.5
% change from a year ago 1.0 •4.4 10.6 9.5 12 9.4 16.9
Level in PoBcy Scenario 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.7 2.1
% change from a year ago 1.0 •4.4 14.9 15.3 4.6 26.1 25.5
% deviation from Baselne 0.0 0.0 3.8 9.3 13.1 30.5 40.1
Farmers In Ag. banks' lending area
who Ned for bankruptcy (percent):
Level in Basefine 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8
% change from a year ago *5.9 2.9 -2.4 8.0 5.1 -32 2.4
Level In PoOcy Scenario 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.3
% change from a year ago -5.9 2.9 -2.4 11.8 10.3 -0.1 17.8
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 8.5 11.9 28.8
Times Interest Earned
Level in Baseline 4.3 4.6 4.0 3.9 4.1 3.7 3.3
% change from a year ago *14.3 5.7 -13.0 -2.7 5.1 •6.4 -10.0
Level in Policy Scenario 4.31 4.58 3.81 3.60 3.77 3.04 2.80
% change from a year ago *14.3 5.7 -16.5 -5.5 4.9 •19.5 •8.0
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 -3.9 •6.7 •6.9 •18.1 -16.3
Debt Burden Ratio
Level in Baseline 3.7 3.4 4.0 4.0 3.6 3.8 4.1
% change from a year ago 112 -6.5 15.7 0.1 -9.6 7.3 6.7
Level in Policy Scenario 3.68 3.42 4.18 4.36 3.95 5.12 5.35
% change from a year ago 112 •6.5 22.2 4.3 -9.5 29.7 4.5
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 5.6 10.0 10.0 33.0 30.3
Financial Leverage Index
Level in Baseline 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8
% change from a year ago -4.4 1.6 -3.7 42 1.9 -2.6 -4.0
Level in Policy Scenario 0.91 0.93 0.68 0.87 0.88 0.81 0.78
% change from a year ago -4.4 1.6 •5.1 -1.3 1.9 4.1 *4.3
% deviation from Baseline 00 0.0 -1.4 -2.5" -2.4 •6.0 -82
Debt-to-A$set Ratio (
Level in Baseline 02 02 02 02 02 02 02
% change from a year ago -1.4 0.0 2.8 3.8 0.8 2.1 0.4
Level in Policy Scenario 0.16 0.16 0.16 \0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
% change from a year ago *1.4 0.0 2.6 \42 0.5 32 -0.1% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 -0.1 \).3 -0.0 1.1 0.6
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Table A10. South Region: Stress Measures for Baseline and 10% Cut in TP
Projected Measures of Regional Financial
POLICY Stress In Agriculture
SCENARIO: Cut Target Price 10 Percent
Year
SOUTH REGION in4 in* Iftfi IffZ IMS IMS 2QQQ
Farm loan volume at Ag. banks
delnquent 30 days or more (percent):
Level In Beselne 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 12
% change from a year ago 30.3 9.0 -1.7 2.7 3.7 4.7 8.9
Level In Polcy Scenario * 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 12
% change from a year ago 30.3 9.0 -1.0 3.4 4.1 42 6.3
% delation from Beselne 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.4 1.7 1.3 -1.1
Farmers In Ag. benks' lending area
who Ned for bankruptcy (percent):
Level in Beselne 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
% change from a year ago -19.1 5.9 10.8 -2.1 -1.5 02 -0.5
Level in Polcy Scenario 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
% change from a year ago -19.1 5.9 10* •1.3 *0.7 0.7 -0.9
% delation from Beselne 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.6 22 1.8
Times Interest Earned
Level In Beselne 6.6 8.3 6.5 8.3 8.1 7.9 7.4
% change from a year ago -0.5 -3.6 2.1 -2.1 -2.3 •2.9 •5.6
Level in Polcy Scenario 8.62 8.31 8.44 823 8.02 7.82 7.51
% change from a year ago -0.5 -3.6 1.6 -2.5 -2.5 -2.6 -4.0
% deviation from Beselne 0.0 0.0 -0.5 •0.9 -1.1 -0.7 0.9
Debt Burden Ratio
Level in Beselne 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
% change from a year ago 9.6 6.7 -3.9 •0.6 0.5 -0.4 1.4
Level in Polcy Scenario 1.77 1.89 1.62 1.62 1.83 1.82 1.81
S change from a year ago 9.6 6.7 -3.3 -02 0.7 •0.6 -0.5
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.0 1.3 0.9 •1.1
Financial Leverage Index
Level In Beselne 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
% change from a year ago 1.1 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.4 -0.1 -0.8
Level In Polcy Scenario 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.07
% change from a year ago 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.3 -0.3 -0.6
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 -02 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.4
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
Level in Baseline 0.2 02 02 02 02 02 02
% change from a year ago 6.0 2.9 0.8 4.3 32 1.4 0.1
Level in Policy Scenario 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
% change from a year ago 6.0 2.9 0.1 42 3.0 0.1 0.1
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -0.8 -1.0 -2.1 -2.1
Table A11. West Stress Measures for Baseline and Slower Money Growth
Projected Measures of Regional Financial
POUCY Stress in Agriculture
SCENARIO: 2% Slower Qtovrth In Monty
Year
WEST REGION 1994 1995 1199 1197 Iff! 1999 2000
Farm loan volume at Ag. banks
\
delinquent 30 days or more (percent):
Level in BaseNne 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.0 2.1
% change from a year ago 21.5 1.4 •1.3 3.7 2.3 6.0 72
Level in PoScy Scenario 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.1 22 2.4
% change from a year ego 21.5 4.8 3.6 8.9 4.6 6.8 4.7
% deviation from Baseline -0.0 3.4 6.5 14.0 16.7 17.5 14.6
Farmers in Ag. banks* lending area
who filed for bankruptcy (percent): \ -
Level in Baseine 22 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
% change from a year ago •22.0 -6.7 -3.1 -3.1 -1.1 -0.7 0.6
Level in Polcy Scenario 22 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
% change from a year ago •22.0 -6.7 -2.9 -3.0 -0.6 •0.4 1.1
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 -0.0 0.1 02 0.6 1.0 1.5
Times Interest Earned Ratio
Level in Beseln^~"w 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.5 62 5.8
% change from a year ago -6.5 1.4 1.3 -3.3 -1.5 -4.7 -52
Level In PoHqy Scenario 6.60 6.50 6.34 5.91 5.75 5.46 529
% change from a year ago -6.5 •1.5 -2.5 •6.8 -2.8 -5.0 -3.1
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 -2.9 •6.5 •9.9 -11.1 -11.4 -9.5
Debt Burden Ratio
Level in Baseline 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5
% change from a year ago 7.8 0.0 -3.1 0.6 -0.5 1.8 1.5
Level in Policy Scenario 2.50 2.51 2.43 2.46 2.46 2.52 2.51
% change from a year ago 7.8 02 -3.1 1.4 -02 2.4 -0.3
% deviation from Basekne -0.0 02 0.3 1.0 12 1.9 0.1
Financial Leverage Index
■
Level in Baseline 1.0 10 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
% change from a year ago •12 0.3 02 02 0.3 -0.6 -1.0
Level in Polcy Scenario 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.96
% change from a year ago •12 -02 -0.5 •0.4 -0.1 -1.0 •0.6
% deviation from Baseline -0.0 -0.5 -12 -1.9 -22 •2.6 -2.4
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
Level in Baseline 02 02 02 02 02 02 02
% change from a year ago 1.8 0.4 -0.1 4.1 2.8 1.6 0.3
Level In Policy Scenario 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
% change from a year ago 1.8 0.4 -0.3 4.9 2.6 0.4 -0.4
% deviation from Baseline -0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.6 0.4 -0.7 -1.3
Table A12. Plaint: Strata Meaturet for Batefina and Slower Money Growth
Projected Maaturet of Regional Financial
POUCY
SCENARIO: 2% Slower Orowtti In Monty
PUUNS REGION 19*4 itts
Stress In Agficuture
Year
1991 1997 1991 1999 2900
Farm loan volume at Ag. banks
definquent 30 dayt or more (percent):
Level in Batefina 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.6 2.0 2.1 2.4
% change from a year ago 28.0 10.6 17.0 11.0 5.6 9.8 12.7
Level in Poicy Scenario 1.3 1.5 1.6 2.1 2.3 2.6 3.1
% change from a year ago 28.9 14.4 24.7 15.5 10.7 12.0 17.0
% deviefion from B^japne 0.0 3.5 10.3 14.7 20.3 22.6 27.4
Farmers in Ag. banks' landtag area
who Nad for bankruptcy (percent):
Level in Baaalna 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9
% change from a year ago *8.8 13.5 2.3 6.2 1.9 -0.5 2.3
Level in Poficy Scenario 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9
% change from a year ago *8.8 13.5 2.6 6.9 1.7 0.5 2.9
% deviaton from Batefina 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.0 0.8 1.9 2.5
/
'Times Interest Earned
Level in Batefina 4.6 4.7 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.4
% change from a year ago •32.0 3.0 -11.8 -3.0 -0.3 -7.5 -82
Level In Poficy Scenario 4.55 4.51 3.77 3.62 3.49 3.24 2.88
% change from a year ago -32.0 •1.0 -16.5 •4.0 -3.5 -7.1 -112
% deviation from Basefine 0.0 •3.9 •9.0 -9.9 -12.7 -12.3 -152
Debt Burden Ratio
Level in Batefina 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.1
% change from a year ago 49.4 -6.3 13.5 -12 -2.9 62 6.1
Level in Poficy Scenario 3.56 3.36 3.87 3.79 3.78 4.03 4.59
% change from a year ago 49.4 -5.7 15.2 -2.1 -0.3 6.7 13.9
% delation from Baseline 0.0 0.6 2.1 12 3.9 4.4 12.1
Financial Leverage Index
Level in Batefina 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
% change from a year ago -6.3 12 -3.1 0.0 0.5 *2.3 -3.1
Level in Poficy Scenario 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.82
% change from a year ago -6.3 0.1 -5.1 -0.3 -0.7 •2.8 -5.4
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 -1.1 -3.1 -3.5 *4.6 -52 -7.4
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
Level in Batefina 02 02 02 02 0.2 02 02
% change from a year ago 11.5 1.6 2.6 4.6 2.7 1.9 0.7
Level in Poficy Scenario 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 020 020
% change from a year ago 11.5 1.8 2.7 5.2 3.0 .0.9 1.0
% deviation from Baseline 0.0 0.1 02 0.7 1.0 -0.1 02
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Table A13. Northeast Stress Measures for Baseline and Slower Money Growth
Projected Measures of Regional Financial
POUCY Stress in Agriculture
SCENARIO: 2% Stowtf Growth In Momy
Year
NORTHEAST REGION in4 IMS 1IM lltZ lfH lift 2000
Farm loan volume at Ag. banks
deRnquent 30 days or more (percent):
Level in BaseRne 1.7 1.7 1.0 2.0 2.1 22 2.5
% change from a year ago •0.8 3.0 8.t 5.1 4.4 7.9 10.9
Level In Polcy Scenario 1.7 1.8 2.0 22 2.4 2.7 3.0
% change from a year ago 4.8 5.5 14.0 11.1 8.9 10.0 11.8
% deviation from BaseRne 0.0 2.4, 7.3 13.5 18.4 20.7 21.6
Farmers in Ag. banks' lending area
who Med for bankruptcy (percent):
Level in BaseRne 3.1 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1
% change from a year ago 23.5 •26.7 -8.4 0.7 -1.0 4.3 2.4
Level in PoRcy Scenario 3.1 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1 2$
% change from a year ago 23.5 -26.7 •6.9 0.7 4.4 12 3.9
% deviation from BaseRne 0.0 •0.0 -0.5 4.6 4.0 1.5 2.9
Times Interest Earned
Level in BaseRne 6.4 6.1 5.7 5.6 5.5 52 4.9
% change from a year ago 5.4 •4.9 -6.5 -1.8 •22 -5.4 4.8
Level in PoRcy Scenario 6.4 6.0 5.4 5.1 4.9 4.6 4.3
% change from a year ago 5.4 -7.0 -9.7 -52 •42 -5.7 4.8
% deviation from BaseRne 0.0 •22 -5.5 ,4.8 -10.7 -11.0 -11.1
Debt Burden Ratio
Level in Baseline 1.8 2.0 21 2.1 2.1 2.1 22
% change from a year ago -34.3 7.9 5.5 -1.4 02 2.6 3.7
Level in PoRcy Scenario 1.83 1.97 2.08 2.07 2.09 2.16 226
* change from a year ago -34.3 7.4 5.7 4.8 1.4 3.3 4.4
% deviation from BaseRne •0.0 •0.5 4.3 0.3 1.5 2.1 2.8
Financial Leverage Index
Level in Baseline 1.0 1.0^09 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
% change from a year ago -3.6 -or -1.2 0.1 4.1 -1.1 -1.8
Level in Policy Scenario 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.69
% change from a year ago -3.6 -1.1 -2.0 4.7 4.7 -1.6 -2.0
% deviation from Baseline -0.0 -0.4 -1.3 -2.1 -2.6 -3.1 4.4
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
Level in Bgse&ne 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
% change from a year ago -24.1 2.1 1.5 3.5 2.6 1.3 42
Level in Policy Scenario .0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14
% change from a year ago -24.1 2.0 12 4.1 2.5 4.1 4.1
% deviation from Baseline -0.0 4.1 4.3 02 0.1 -12 -12
Table A14. Com Belt Stress Measures for Baseline and Slower Money Growth
^Projected Measures of Regional Financial
Stress in Agriculture
Year
1*4 It* It* ittz It* It* 2000
1.0 1.0 1.1 12 12 1.3 1.5
1.0 •4.4 10.6 9.5 1.2 9.4 16.9
1.0 1.0 1.1 12 1.4 1.7 22
1.0 -3.1 10.8 7.0 13.2 19.5 34.6
0.0 1.4 7.0 4.6 17.0 27.P 47.2
1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8
•5.9 2.9 -2.4 8.0 5.1 -32 2.4
1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8
-5.9 2.9 •2.6 8.5 •2.8 1.1 72
0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -7.6 -3.5 0.9
4.3 4.6 4.0 3.9 4.1 3.7 3.3
-14.3 5.7 -13.0 -2.7 5.1 •8.4 -10.0
4.31 4.49 3.72 3.85 3.53 3.18 2.61
-14.3 A2 -17.2 3.5 -62 •10.0 -17.8
0.0 -1.5 -62 -02 -12.8 -14.4 -21.7
POLICY
SCENARIO: J% Slower GrowfMn Monty
CORN BELT REGION
§
Farm loan volume at Ag. banks
delinquent 30 days or more (percent):
Level in BaseHne
% change from a year ago
Level In PoRcy Scenario
% change from a year ago
% deviation from BaseRne
Farmers In Ag. banks' lerafing area
who filed for bankruptcy (percent):
Level in BaseHne
% change from a year ago
Level In PoRcy Scenario
% change frofn a year ago
% deviation from Baseline
Times Interest Earned
Level in BaseRne
% change from a year ago
Level in PoRcy Scenario
% change from a year ago
% deviation from Baseline
Debt Burden Ratio
Level in BaseRne
% change from a year ago
Level in PoRcy Scenario
% change from a year ago
% deviation from BaseRne
Financial Leverage Index
Level in Baseline
% change from a year ago
Level in PoRcy Scenario
% change from a year ago
% deviation from Baseline
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
Level in Baseline
% change from a year ago
Level in Policy Scenario
% change from a year ago
% deviation from Baseline
3.7 3.4 4.0 4.0 3.6 3.8 4.1
112 -6.5 15.7 0.1 -9.8 7.3 6.7
3.66 3.40 3.98 3.51 3.67 4.05 5.15
112 -7.1 17.0 -11.9 4.7 10.3 272
0.0 -0.7 0.4 -11.7 22 52 25.4
0.9 0.9 . 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8
-4.4 1.6 -3.7 -02 1.9 -2.6 -4.0
0.91 0.92 0.87 0.89 0.66 0.83 0.75
-4.4 12 -5.4 1.7 -2.6 - -42 -9.5
-0.0 -0.4 -22 -0.3 -4.7 -62 -11.5
02 02 02 02 02 02 02
-1.4 0.0 2.8 3.8 0.8 2.1 0.4
0.18 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18
-1.4 -0.1 2.8 2.4 3.1 1.1 2.4
-0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -1.4 0.8 -02 1.8
Table A15. South: Strata Measures for Baseline and Slower Money Growth
Projected Measures of Regional Financial
POLICY Stress in Agriculture
SCENARIO: 2% Slower Growth In Money
Year
SOUTH REGION 1*4 1*5 It* 1*Z It* It* 2900
Farm loan volume at Ag. banks
delinquent 30 days or more (percent):
level in Baselne 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 12
% change from a year ago 30.3 9.0 -1.7 2.7 3.7 4.7 6.9
Level in Poicy Scenario 0.9 1.0 1.1 12 12 1.3 1.4
% change from a year ago 30.3 13.2 3.7 8.9 6.7 6.3 5.9
% deviation from Baselne 0.0 3.9 9.7 162 19.6 21.4 18.1
Farmers in Ag. banks' lending area
who filed for bankruptcy (percent):
Level in Baselne 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
% change from a year ago -19.1 5.9 10.6 -2.1 -1.5 02 -0.5
Level in Poicy Scenario 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
% change from a year ago •19.1 5.9 10.6 -2.5 -1.3 02 0.5
S deviation from Baselne 0.0 M>.0 0.1 •0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.9
Times Interest Earned
Level in Baselne 8.6 8.3 8.5 8.3 A.1 7.9 7.4
% change from a year ago •0.5 -3.6 2.1 -2.1 -2.3 -2.9 -5.6
Level in Poicy Scenario 6.82 6.08 7.97 7.52 723 6.96 6.72
% change from a year ago -0.5 -62 -1.4 -5.6 -3.8 -3.7 -3.5
% deviation from Baselne 0.0 -2.7 -6.1 -9.5 -10.9 -11.8 -9.7
Debt Burden Rato
Level in Baseline 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
% change from a year ago 9.6 6.7 -3.9 -0.6 0.5 -0.4 1.4
Level in Poicy Scenario 1.77 1.69 1.81 1.80 1.81 1.81 1.81
% change from a year ago 9.6 6.8 •42 -0.4 0.4 0.3 -02
% deviation from Baselne -0.0 0.0 •02 •0.0 -0.1 0.7 •0.9
Financial Leverage Index
Level in Baselne 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
% change from a year ago 1.1 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.4 -0.1 ■0.8
Level in Policy Scenario 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.06
% change from a year ago 1.1 -0.3 -0.1 02 0.1 -0.6 -0.7
% deviation from Baselne 0.0 -0.4 -0.9 -1.4 -1.7 -22 -2.0
Debt-to-Asset Rato
Level in Baselne 02 02 02 02 02 02 02
% change from a year ago 6.0 2.9 0.8 4.3 32 1.4 0.1
Level in Policy Scenario 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
% change from a year ago * 6.0 2.9 0.5 4.9 3.0 0.1 -02






Figure Bl. Comparing West Region's Actual to Predicted Past Due Loans
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Figure B3. Comparing Plains Region's Actual to Predicted Past Due Loans
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Figure B5. Comparing Northeast Region's Actual to Predicted Past Due Loans
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Figure B7. Comparing Com Belt Region's Actual to Predicted Past Due Loans
Corn Belt Region
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Figure B9. Comparing South Region’s Actual to Predicted Past Due Loans
Sooth Region
Bankruptcies
figure BIO. Comparing South Region's Actual to Predicted Bankruotcies
